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INTRODUCTION
1

The firm has come undone. The break-up started as an idea in
finance, where options pricing and transaction cost analysis traced
the firm’s fault lines with theoretical implications about how the firm
2
funds itself. Then, traders went to work, turning these financial in1

Instead of thinking of it as a solid entity, see the firm as a cipher and accounting rules as the symbol system that constitutes and decodes the cipher. Accounting
theorists see the firm this way. See, e.g., Jim Donegan & Shyam Sunder, Contract Theoretic Analysis of Off-Balance Sheet Financing, J. ACCT. AUDITING & FIN., March 1989, at
203, 204 (“From the representational faithfulness perspective, the firm is seen as a
collection of economic facts; accounting methods are evaluated by their ability to
produce numbers and disclosures that approximate these facts as closely as possible.”) (citations omitted). The “facts” are value propositions about cash flows and
contingencies. The law of financial reporting is the syntax and the grammar of this
language and each financial report is a novel utterance. A good transactional lawyer
is a finance semiotician too. See generally Lawrence A. Cunningham, Semiotics, Hermeneutics, and Cash: An Essay on the True and Fair View, 28 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG.
893, 894–95 (2003) (arguing that a hermeneutic approach to accounting would facilitate the convergence of national accounting standards).
2
Two major insights that in particular helped to atomize the firm’s cash flows
were options pricing and transaction cost economics. In 1973, a paper by Fischer
Black and Myron Scholes transformed finance by demonstrating a mathematical approach to pricing options and corporate liabilities. Fischer Black & Myron S. Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities, 81 J. POL. ECON. 637 (1973). A new
part of financial speech, options pricing let traders estimate the value of bundles of
financial risk which had previously been held hostage to whole asset forms. In other
words, the Black-Scholes model helped to demonstrate that an option is the smallest
unit of financial contingency. See infra note 185 for an example of an options pricing
analogy for the federal government’s risk with respect to federally-insured deposits.
Maturing after options pricing, transaction cost economics provided an intellectual
foundation for increased scrutiny of the “make-or-buy” problem as applied to funding. See Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm (1937), reprinted in THE NATURE OF THE
FIRM: ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND DEVELOPMENT 18 (Oliver Williamson ed., 1990) (illuminating how a firm’s organizational structure reflects the decisions by a firm to
economize on costs by sometimes internalizing factors of production and, at other
times buying them in the open market); see also OLIVER WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC
INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 2–12 (1985) (putting the 1937 article in the context of
the analytical approaches which developed in its wake). See infra notes 257–61, 275–
78 and accompanying text for recommendations to reduce the transaction costs of
gathering information about firms’ effective capital structure in order to promote
greater investor understanding of firm funding. See generally Charles R.P. Pouncy,
Contemporary Financial Innovation: Orthodoxy and Alternatives, 51 SMU L. REV. 505, 551–
54 (1998) (arguing that the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis, modern portfolio
theory, the Modigliani-Miller theorem about optimal capital structure, and options
pricing provided the rationale for wide use of new financial products).
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sights into self-sustaining markets where firms could meet their needs
3
for liquidity and capital with complex products. Here, securitization
4
and other forms of disintermediation made funds more mobile and
5
helped to “complete” the financial markets. Understandably, the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and accounting regula6
tors did not keep pace with these dynamic shifts. Before these shifts,
3

When used to describe a firm, “liquidity” means the firm’s ability to satisfy its
payment obligations as they become due. See U.S. COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY,
LIQUIDITY: COMPTROLLER’S HANDBOOK 1 (2001), available at http://www.occ.treas.
gov/handbook/liquidity.pdf. Prudential regulation of depository institutions has the
most systematic approach to firm liquidity. See also generally JARL KALLBERG &
KENNETH PARKINSON, CORPORATE LIQUIDITY: MANAGEMENT AND MEASUREMENT (1993).
See Pouncy, supra note 2, at 527–34, 569–71 (showing how competition and interest
in speculation led to intermediation in firm funding through swaps, derivatives,
money market instruments, and securitization).
4
“Funding” refers to how the firm finances its activities. See LIQUIDITY:
COMPTROLLER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 9–22 (summarizing liquidity sources and
distinguishing between retail and wholesale funding sources). In general, funding
relates to the liabilities and equity accounts on the right hand side of the balance
sheet. An operational rather than legal concept, funding refers to how the firm stays
afloat as an obligor. To appreciate what funding means to transactional lawyers, visit
The Bond Market Association, Funding, http://www.bondmarkets.com/funding
(last visited Feb. 18, 2006). “Disintermediation” means any substitution in the funding market by one liquidity or capital source for another.
See LIQUIDITY:
COMPTROLLER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 1–2 (explaining how the shift from retail
to wholesale funding by banks has increased their overall liquidity risk). A là Coase,
transaction cost efficiencies drive these substitutions. For example, the commercial
paper market took off because high-quality borrowers could borrow more cheaply by
issuing their own paper to investors rather than by getting a bank loan. See John P.
Judd, Competition Between the Commercial Paper Market and Commercial Banks, ECON. REV.
(1st Q. 1979), at 39. Similarly, transaction accounts with nonbank financial institutions have diverted customer deposits from banks, now scrambling for low-cost funding. (Deposits were the manna of bank funding because they were cheap.) See, e.g.,
Robert Litan, The Revolution in U.S. Finance: Past, Present, and Future, Remarks
Before The American College, Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania (Apr. 30, 1991) (explaining
how receivables securitization transformed the flow of funds between financial intermediaries) (copy on file with author).
5
A complete market is one in which all commodities and claims can be traded.
WILLIAM H. BEAVER, FINANCIAL REPORTING: AN ACCOUNTING REVOLUTION 38–39 (3d
ed. 1998). See also Mario Draghi et al., Transparency, Risk Management and International Financial Fragility, at 1 (Harv. Bus. Sch. Working Paper No. 03-118, 2003) (“The
role of swaps and other privately negotiated derivative instruments is to complete financial markets, thus increasing the ability of individuals, financial institutions, corporations and governments to manage risk.”).
6
This is another example of the point that “[c]ontemporary financial innovation is a dance between the regulator and the regulated.” Pouncy, supra note 2, at
546 (showing how heterodox economic theory reveals a wider range of public risks
from derivatives and financial innovation generally than does orthodox economics).
Pouncy notes how firms mitigate the costs of regulation through tactical innovation:
Kane has characterized this process as the “regulatory dialectic.” This
process is a continual struggle between regulators and the regulated in
which regulatory policy is confronted with financial innovation de-
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readers of financial reports could look to the balance sheet as a
7
rough proxy for a firm’s net worth. But as firm managers turned increasingly to “off-balance-sheet” (OBS) arrangements like swaps and
special purpose vehicles, the balance sheet lost its faithfulness as a
8
public financial report. Investors outside of the charmed circle of
the financially initiated were lost.
The gap between what public financial reports say about funding
and how the cash actually moves in and out of firms became apparent
with some highly publicized losses at Enron and other large firms,
9
many of which involved cash flow games. A Greek chorus of indignant legislators, disgruntled investors, and evasive regulators blamed
the losses on rogue managers and officers at these firms. These cads
had broken the rules of the game, said the chorus. A special fury
went to the auditors who had given the rogues cover under financial
accounting. In this blame narrative, financiers became folk devils
who threatened virtuous wealth accumulation by retail investors and
signed to circumvent the policy. Regulatory policy is then adjusted to
counteract the circumventive innovation, which, in turn, induces another innovative response. This process is also known as Goodhart’s
Law, which concludes that “basing a policy upon a recognized statistical
relationship will bring about a policy-induced change in the relationship.”
Id. (footnotes omitted) (citing Edward J. Kane, Microeconomic and Macroeconomic Origins of Financial Innovation, in FINANCIAL INNOVATION 5–6 (William L. Silber ed.,
1975)); see also infra notes 262–75 and accompanying text for a critical evaluation of
the agency’s knowledge base.
7
See infra notes 107–14 and accompanying text to appreciate the scope of the
balance sheet.
8
State law, the certificate of incorporation, or a bond covenant may let other
corporate constituencies vote on fundamental questions of capital structure. See
JERRY W. MARKHAM & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, CORPORATE FINANCE: CASES AND MATERIALS
156–220 (2004). It is, however, the firm’s managers who run its day-to-day funding,
including the use of off-balance-sheet arrangements.
9
In addition to Enron, recent prominent corporate scandals have included
Dynegy (misrepresentation of cash flows on its statement of cash flows), Global
Crossing (potential phantom transactions with no economic substance), Adelphia
(three billion dollars in questionable loans), Tyco (charges of tax evasion and evidence tampering), WorldCom (significant accounting irregularities), Xerox Company (accounting irregularities), Arthur Andersen (obstruction of justice claim),
KPMG (auditing malfeasance), ImClone (insider trading), and Merrill Lynch &
Company (deceptive securities analysis). See generally Jerry W. Markham, Accountants
Make Miserable Policemen: Rethinking the Federal Securities Laws, 28 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM.
REG. 725, 773–86 (2003) (reviewing asset write-downs, rising earnings restatements,
and other accounting irregularities leading to market and Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) interventions). For a bibliography of over one hundred legal,
administrative, and congressional documents related just to Enron, the most notorious of these scandals, see Stephanie Burke, The Collapse of Enron: A Bibliography of
Online Legal, Governmental and Legislative Resources, Apr. 15, 2002, http://www.llrx.
com/features/enron.htm.
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others. (Much of what was “lost” was unrealized value created by
these rogues in the first place using the same accounting practices,
but more about this later.) The pattern of losses across firms cast
doubt on the financial reporting model overall, including the statement of cash flows, a financial report which had previously stood in
10
relatively good repute.
Financial moral panic! A moral panic starts with some bit of reality and then mushrooms into a movement for reform as sensational11
ist media reports fuel populist outrage over wrongdoing. In a moral
panic, “[s]tatements that would . . . mark the speaker as hyperbolic or
paranoid suddenly acquire the status of incontestable fact, while
12
skeptics are pitied for their callous denial.” In this nervous climate,
Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley or
13
Act). Moral panic legislation blames social problems on bad people
rather than bad structures and the Act bears these hallmarks by casting corporate officials and auditors as deviants. In this case, casting
financiers as miscreants substituted for a more nuanced examination
of whether the law of financial reporting adequately mapped firms’
true capital structure in light of the dynamic funding shifts of the past
14
thirty years.
To Congress’s credit, the Act roused the SEC from its slumber
over accounting. Specifically, the Act directed the agency to require
publicly-registered firms to say more about these curious “off-balancesheet” items, which had previously escaped much substantive disclo15
sure. Under the baleful glare of Congress, the SEC adopted a rule
10

The balance sheet is built on generally accepted accounting principles
(GAAP), the basis for financial accounting. See Markham, supra note 9, at 765–68
(reviewing the development of generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS) and
GAAP).
11
See infra notes 32–53 and accompanying text for an explanation of moral panic
and moral panic analysis.
12
PHILIP JENKINS, MORAL PANIC: CHANGING CONCEPTS OF THE CHILD MOLESTER IN
MODERN AMERICA 7 (1998) (analyzing the moral panics from 1890s–1990s about the
sexual abuse of minors). To understand the analogy drawn in this Article, substitute
“financier” for “child molester.”
13
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 7201–66 (Supp. II 2002)).
14
By the law of financial reporting I mean only federal securities laws, not state
laws that impose financial reporting requirements.
15
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 401(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7261(c)(1) (Supp. II 2002),
added § 13(j) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which required the SEC to
amend its rules to require each annual and quarterly financial report required to be
filed with the SEC to disclose:
all material off-balance sheet transactions, arrangements, obligations
(including contingent obligations), and other relationships of the issuer with unconsolidated entities or other persons, that may have a ma-
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that selectively increases the transparency of firms’ effective capital
structure by making them consider the financial impact of some types
16
of OBS arrangements. When reporting to Congress on the rule’s
efficacy and the current structure of the OBS market, though, the
17
SEC admitted that market transparency problems persist. Given the
ongoing gap between publicly-reported funding and funding as the
daily practice of survival by firms, do public financial reports say
enough about how a firm finances itself? Not yet. Much of what led
18
to Enron and the other losses continues. What is needed is a technical legal approach rather than the now-familiar “perp” walk on the
nightly news.
19
Like marabunta, scholars have descended upon the Act’s provisions about corporate governance, the audit process, and accounting
generally. My own ant-like contribution to this debate is to frame the
Act in terms of financial moral panic, to point out how this legislative

terial current or future effect on financial condition, changes in financial condition, results of operations, liquidity, capital expenditures,
capital resources, or significant components of revenues or expenses.
15 U.S.C. § 78m(j) (Supp. II 2002).
16
SEC Final Rule: Disclosure in Management’s Discussion and Analysis about
Off-Balance Sheet Arrangements and Aggregate Contractual Obligations, Exchange
Act Release No. 34-47264 (Jan. 28, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/
final/33-8182.htm, codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 228–29, 249 (2005).
17
See OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ACCOUNTANT, SEC, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
PURSUANT TO SECTION 401(C) OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 ON ARRANGEMENTS
WITH OFF-BALANCE SHEET IMPLICATIONS, SPECIAL PURPOSE ENTITIES, AND TRANSPARENCY
OF FILINGS BY ISSUERS 40 (2005), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/soxoffbalancerpt.
pdf [hereinafter SEC REPORT]. See also infra notes 225–34 and accompanying text
about the SEC’s conclusion that opacity persists with respect to the transparency of
firms’ OBS dealings.
18
See Frank Partnoy, A Revisionist View of Enron and the Sudden Death of “May,” 48
VILL. L. REV. 1245, 1264 (2003) (arguing that Sarbanes-Oxley failed to appreciate the
significance of risk from OBS derivatives to the Enron crisis):
Moreover, pre-Enron market failures are likely to continue if certain
structural conditions in the market persist. First, disclosure related to
derivatives positions is costly, and those costs are not reduced by the
collapse of Enron; indeed, the cost of derivatives disclosure is greater if
market participants are more concerned about such disclosures. Second, it is not necessarily easier for market participants to assess derivatives disclosure (or non-disclosure) post-Enron; they have similar technological capacity and access to information. Moreover, the gap
between what managers know and what shareholders understand could
persist if both issuers and investors become more sophisticated.
Id. (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
19
Also called the New World Army Ants, the marabunta travel in hordes and devour agricultural land. See New World Army Ants, http://www.armyants.org (last visited Feb. 19, 2006); La Marabunta, http://www.lamarabunta.org/ (last visited Feb.
19, 2006) (Spanish-language site for ant enthusiasts).
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approach limited the Act’s efficacy in predictable ways, and to recommend changes to reduce, if possible, the risk of future financial
moral panics. Indeed, as noted, post-Enron scholarship ought to restore a factual rather than moral approach to complex financial
20
transactions.
With an argument used historically by the Left, Part I explains
21
how financial moral panic was the zeitgeist for the Act. In a financial moral panic, false cause obscures a more complete understanding of cause-in-fact by blaming what are really routine market losses
on individuals deemed to have acted in exceptionally opportunistic
ways. The Act’s legislative history shows how financiers came to be
viewed as folk devils and financial predators. Framed this way, their
misconduct would distract investors and others from ambient economic anxieties about the ongoing market risk of unrealized gain in
financial assets, an anxiety made more acute during a price bubble.
Unfortunately, structural economic insecurity transcends individual
misconduct. Indeed, this insecurity is intrinsic to our economic system.
Turning from cultural studies to financial reporting, Part II explains, again, why the balance sheet no longer reflects a firm’s finan22
cial position. The aim here is to provide a critical counterpoint to
the prevailing view that financiers at Enron and other firms destroyed
“real” shareholder value, often with bogus deals involving off-balancesheet arrangements. Indeed, managers’ fiduciary duties to shareholders may have obliged these managers to use such arrangements
(and, indeed, may continue to do so) for the sake of increasing re20

See Partnoy, supra note 18, at 1247 (arguing that regulatory responses to Enron
based on the idea that fraud rather than financial complexity of derivatives led to
Enron are misguided). Such scholarship has already been developed with respect to
securitization, which suffered guilt-by-association to the extent that it was associated
with Enron’s OBS practices. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Securitization Post-Enron, 25
CARDOZO L. REV. 1539, 1568–74 (2004) (clarifying the value of securitization); Steven
L. Schwarcz, Enron and the Use and Abuse of Special Purpose Entities in Corporate Structures, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 1309, 1318 (2002) (“Ultimately, the greatest danger of the
Enron debacle is our possible overreaction, and consequent over-regulation.”); see
also William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REV.
1275, 1283 (2002) (“[T]he rogue characterization serves a double function—it deflects attention from the respectable community’s own business practices. This Article aspires to counterbalance with a picture of Enron’s collapse that deemphasizes
the rogue to focus on the regular.”); Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure
Paradigm in a World of Complexity, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 18–19 (challenging the efficacy of mere disclosure of extremely complex financial instruments because disclosure will not produce a critical mass of investors who understand the transaction reasonably promptly).
21
See infra notes 54–104 and accompanying text.
22
See infra notes 122–34, 217–24 and accompanying text.
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sidual return. To show how better cash flow reporting may have
stemmed these losses, this Article discusses the statement of cash
flows, a relative late-comer to the financial reporting model. This is
part of a plea for reporting a firm’s effective capital structure to improve the overall usefulness of public reports to financial reporting’s
diverse constituencies, i.e., investors, financial regulators, managers,
23
auditors, and information intermediaries. More granular disclosure
would benefit investors (even though it might increase firms’ reported volatility) by reminding investors of the unavoidable uncertainty of future financial states of the world. Part III then discusses
24
the SEC’s OBS disclosure rule. In truth, despite its substantial limitations, the rule contributes to the evolution of financial reporting
because the rule makes firms say more about their effective capital
25
structure. But more is needed.
Part IV recommends some technical improvements to these
26
technical problems. First, the SEC should require firms to disclose a
transparency ratio on the balance sheet which suggests the magni27
tude of OBS items not otherwise disclosed. Revealing the fact of
28
nondisclosure would seem to be a corollary of disclosure. Such a financial transparency ratio would reduce the information gap between firm insiders and outsiders without too much reporting
“noise.” Second, the SEC should require the reporting of more firm23

Beaver notes that financial reporting balances the interests of five distinct constituencies: investors choosing between alternative investment portfolios, financial
reporting regulators concerned about capital formation and resource allocation,
firms’ managers interested in increasing shareholder wealth and their own, auditors
who need financial information to certify a firm’s financial reports, and information
intermediaries involved in searching out and processing “raw” financial data. See
BEAVER, supra note 5, at 150–56.
24
See infra notes 187–216 and accompanying text.
25
See infra notes 198–203 and accompanying text.
26
See infra notes 245–80 and accompanying text.
27
I use the word “firm” broadly to mean any business that consumes financial
capital. So that includes corporations, partnerships, limited liability entities, business
trusts, and other forms of business organization. Federal securities laws require any
firm with $10 million or more in assets and five hundred or more owners of any class
of equity securities to register with the SEC. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. §§ 78a–78ll (2000 & Supp. II 2002). Registrants include the country’s largest
corporations, thus including those listed on the exchange and over-the-counter securities markets. My comments about financial reporting obligations under federal securities law apply only to registrants, but the economic arguments in the Article apply to all firms.
28
There are three kinds of knowledge: what one knows, what one knows that one
does not know, and what one does not know that he does not know. The distinction
reflects the behavioral assumption that “human behavior is intendedly rational, but
only limitedly so . . . .” HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR: A STUDY OF
DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES IN ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION xxiv (1961).
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level information about cash flow to help market intermediaries further disaggregate the firm’s cash flows into tradable units. The SEC
29
could do this through the statement of cash flows. If adopted, these
suggestions would increase transparency, enabling traders and other
30
financial intermediaries to further complete funding markets. Also,
the SEC should institutionalize market-wide surveillance of effective
capital structure to increase the agency’s in-house knowledge about
funding trends. So informed, the SEC could better mitigate future
financial moral panics by responding to fear with facts. Part V points
out that there will always be an Enron and that, therefore, transactional law faculty should proselytize students (and seek curricular
rents from deans) in order to increase the transactional and financial
sophistication of law students, who could then better inject sobriety
31
into future panics.
29

In considering cash flow, I join others who note the value of liquidity disclosures. See Matthew J. Barrett, The SEC and Accounting, in Part Through the Eyes of Pacioli, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 837, 863–65 (2005) (praising the value of the liquidity
risk disclosures required to be made by Item 303 of Regulation S-K); Cunningham,
supra note 1, at 924–30 (arguing that increased accounting focus on the statement of
cash flows would facilitate international convergence of accounting standards); Jack
Friedman, Chapter 11 Financial Reporting Rules for Debtors: The Impact on Creditors, Shareholders, New Investors, and the Bar, 9 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 257, 266 (1992) (noting
creditor interest in increased disclosure of cash flow information about debtors);
Henry T. C. Hu, Faith and Magic: Investor Beliefs and Government Neutrality, 78 TEX. L.
REV. 777, 854–60 (2000) (arguing that mutual funds should be subject to the same
general liquidity disclosures currently required for publicly-registered companies);
Stanley Siegel, The Coming Revolution in Accounting: The Emergence of Fair Value as the
Fundamental Principle of GAAP, 42 WAYNE L. REV. 1839, 1850 (1996) (arguing that recent accounting pronouncements recognize the increasing relevance of cash flow
calculations).
30
Accounting considers financial reporting from two distinct but related perspectives: financial reporting as an information tool in the service of market efficiency and financial reporting as a measurement device for a firm’s financial characteristics. See BEAVER, supra note 5, at 76–77. An informational view evaluates the
adequacy of financial reports in terms of their marginal informational value to decision-making about the firm. Id. A measurement view strives for fidelity between a
firm’s financial reports and its financial essence. Id. Although the recommendations
made in Part IV have informational consequences, the thrust of this Article is to
measure the firm as a financial item in a more comprehensive fashion.
31
This Article grew out of teaching the Dynegy case (mentioned supra note 9 and
discussed infra notes 150–53 and accompanying text) in my corporate finance course
at the College of Law. The case resonated with my conclusion from my time in
Washington, D.C. during the Enron hearings that the law has not adequately thematized useful legal standards about how firms fund themselves. The two notable exceptions to this conclusion are the prudential regulation of banks and the net capital
rule for broker-dealers (discussed infra notes 182–85, 263 and accompanying text),
two examples of a federal interest in firm funding. I began writing this Article to
identify OBS arrangements which would be presumptively material under the applicable disclosure standards. Deductive presumptions develop in common law after a
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Congress passed the Act after a hue and cry went up about investor and employee losses caused by accounting irregularities at several
32
national firms. Typical of moral panic legislation, the Act focused
33
on bad actors rather than on bad structures.
In particular, the
thorny issue that the Act and the prior congressional hearings
dodged was the extent of economic insecurity intrinsic to an economy such as ours, in which most people’s wealth takes the form of
unrealized gain in financial assets. As discussed in the following section, displacement of this sort is par for a moral panic. What was
novel about this one was the symbiotic (and ambivalent) relationship
between the moral discourse against the market and the critics’ psychological and financial investment in the market itself. Let me start
by explaining moral panic and moral panic analysis.
A. Moral Panic and Moral Panic Analysis
Moral panic theory claims that the media, moral entrepreneurs,
government authorities, and special interest groups (including values
communities) often react to a perceived threat to a fundamental so34
cial interest by invoking a deviant to blame for the perceived threat.
Stanley Cohen, now a sociologist at the London School of Economics,
introduced the moral panic concept to analyze nervous British reactions to public brawling between two youth groups in Britain: the

period of gestation through inductive adjudication. I had wanted to shortcut that
process, since presumptions can add legal certainty to compliance and can help
judges faced with adjudicating the materiality of complex OBS items. My research,
however, did not turn up enough aggregate data about effective capital structure to
let me articulate a presumption about the materiality of OBS items. So, I offer the
financial transparency ratio discussed herein, infra notes 248–56 and accompanying
text, as a basis for a future presumption about materiality. I leave the project of
building presumptions to the future, my own as well as that of colleagues, critics, and
allies.
32
See supra note 9 listing some of the more prominent examples of the losses attributed to accounting irregularities.
33
See infra notes 95–104 and accompanying text.
34
See STANLEY COHEN, FOLK DEVILS AND MORAL PANICS xxxi (3d ed. 2002). Cohen
notes a concurrent use of the term by another researcher control (Jock Young), and
assumes that both traced the idea of moral panic to Marshall McLuhan. Id.; see generally MARSHALL MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS OF MAN (1964).
Other British sociologists like Stuart Hall also popularized the idea, which formed
part of the cultural studies movement. See infra note 68 and accompanying text for
Hall’s argument about the racialized construction of mugging. See generally Michael
Tonry, Rethinking Unthinkable Punishment Policies in America, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1751,
1782–84 (1999) (reviewing the original clash between the Mods and the Rockers
leading to early moral panic analysis).
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Mods and the Rockers.
which a

35

791

He defined a moral panic as a situation in

condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests; its nature
is presented in a stylized and stereotypical fashion by the mass
media; the moral barricades are manned by editors, bishops, politicians and other right-thinking people; [and] socially accredited
36
experts pronounce their diagnoses and solutions.

Reviewing the deployment of the concept over its busy thirty-year life,
Cohen recently identified seven classic social situations which trigger
37
a moral panic. What the triggers have in common is that they are
perceived by the usual authorities (Church, state, the family or their
diverse proxies) to threaten the social or moral order: young, work38
39
40
ing class violent males; school violence; recreational drug use;
41
child abusers, Satanists, and pedophiles; popular dissemination of
42
sexual and violent content; welfare cheats and single mothers; and
refugees and asylum seekers. Though comprehensive, this is not an

35

See COHEN, supra note 34, passim.
See id. at 1.
37
See id. at viii–xxi. Most of these situation predicates have generated legal scholarship applying moral panic analysis.
38
See, e.g., John M. Hagedorn, Gang Violence in the Postindustrial Era, 24 CRIME &
JUST. 365, 376 (1998) (noting tendency to construct male gangs as deviant during a
moral panic).
39
See, e.g., Aaron H. Caplan, Public School Discipline for Creating Uncensored Anonymous Internet Forums, 39 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 93, 112–20 (2003) (noting moral panic
over use of Internet by teenagers).
40
See, e.g., Kathleen Auerhahn, The Split Labor Market and the Origins of Antidrug
Legislation in the United States, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 411, 411–16 (1999) (using moral
panic analysis to explain how anti-drug legislation acts to manage the formation of
class interests); Theodore Caplow & Jonathan Simon, Understanding Prison Policy and
Population Trends, 26 CRIME & JUST. 63, 85–86 (1999) (noting that drug trafficking and
child abuse have recently produced moral panics).
41
See, e.g., Amy Adler, The Perverse Law of Child Pornography, 101 COLUM. L. REV.
209, 232 (2001) (noting moral panic in connection with child abuse); John Comaroff
& Jean Comaroff, Policing Culture, Cultural Policing: Law and Social Order in Postcolonial
South Africa, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 513, 514–16 (2004) (explaining a moral panic in
South Africa in response to occult-related violence).
42
See Megan Weinstein, The Teenage Pregnancy “Problem”: Welfare Reform and the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 13 BERKELEY
WOMEN’S L.J. 117, 144 (1998) (noting moral panic in response to teen sexual activity); Rachael Knight, Comment, From Hester Prynne to Crystal Chambers: Unwed Mothers,
Authentic Role Models, and Coerced Speech, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 481, 486 (2004)
(analogizing to moral panic to explain the treatment of unwed mothers).
36
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exhaustive list. Crime triggers much moral panic. Sexual and gen44
der minorities are also favorite targets of moral panics.
In each of these cases, an incident or pattern catalyzes preexisting social anxiety and an ad hoc issues movement is born. The
media fans the flames through sensationalist and reductionist news
45
stories. As Cohen notes, identifying a “folk devil” to blame takes the
place of cooler consideration of multivariate causes which may have
46
contributed to the original trigger. Usually, a hasty legal reform results from the panic. Driven as it is by irrationality, the reforms usually miss the point of the original problem and suffer from dispropor47
tionality.
A remedial move made by socially conscious critics, moral panic
theory contests the “folk devil” construction of the problem and reframes it, instead emphasizing structural causes. Thus, moral panic
theory reveals the unstated ideological interests at work in a particular framing of a problem by allowing us “to identify and conceptualize the lines of power in any society, the ways we are manipulated into
taking some things too seriously and other things not seriously
48
enough.” In discussing the Mods and the Rockers, Cohen lists the
two key aspects of a moral panic which moral panic theory targets,
i.e., an ideological slant and false causation:
[T]he point [of moral panic analysis] was to expose social reaction not just as over-reaction in some quantitative sense, but first
as tendentious (that is, slanted in a particular ideological direction)
and second, as misplaced or displaced (that is, aimed—whether de-

43

See, e.g., Sarah Eschholz, The Media and Fear of Crime: A Survey of the Research, 9
J. LAW. & PUB. POL’Y 37, 46–52 (1997) (analyzing the relationship between media coverage of crime and fear of crime); Daniel M. Filler, Silence and the Racial Dimension of
Megan’s Law, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1535, 1581–88 (2004) (noting disparate impact on African Americans of Megan’s Laws requiring registration of persons convicted of sexual
offenses); Neil Gilbert, Advocacy Research and Social Policy, 22 CRIME & JUST. 101, 105
(1997) (noting in connection with rape that research conducted by issue advocates
may contribute to sensationalized reporting); Joseph E. Kennedy, Monstrous Offenders
and the Search for Solidarity Through Modern Punishment, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 829, 860–86
(2000) (using moral panic idea to explain the selected increase in criminal punishment in the United States during the 1980s and 1990s).
44
See Nancy J. Knauer, Homosexuality as Contagion: From the Well of Loneliness to the
Boy Scouts, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 401, 438, (2000) (using moral panic to explain heteronormative reprisal to expressions of same-sex identity); Marc S. Spindelman, Reorienting Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 N.C. L. REV. 359, 446 (2001) (linking constitutional
validation of criminal homosexual sodomy statute to moral panic about AIDS).
45
See COHEN, supra note 34, at 1.
46
Id. at xxii.
47
Id. See also JENKINS, supra note 12.
48
See COHEN, supra note 34, at xxxv.
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liberately or thoughtlessly—at a target which was not the ‘real’
49
problem).

While a moral panic fixates on individual deviants, moral panic
analysis tries to refocus the policy debate on the web of institutions,
ideological interests, and other drivers that work in concert to recast
social anxieties into a discourse about bad people rather than bad
50
conditions. Moral panic theory must evolve in light of changes in
media structure and in reaction to complementary theories of social
construction and cultural studies, of which moral panic was an im51
portant harbinger. By extending the analysis beyond the usual au52
thorities and the usual suspects, my aim is to expand the reach of
53
moral panic arguments into financial legislation as well.

49

Id. at xxxi.
Id. at xxii:
To point to the complexities of the relationship between social objects
and their interpretations is not a ‘criticism’ but the whole point of
studying deviance and social control. Some trivial and harmless forms
of rule-breaking can indeed be ‘blown out of all proportion.’ And yes,
some very serious, significant and horrible events—even genocide, political massacres, atrocities and massive suffering—can be denied, ignored or played down. Most putative problems lie between these two
extremes—exactly where and why calls for a comparative sociology of
moral panic that makes comparisons within one society and also between societies.
51
See Angela McRobbie & Sarah L. Thornton, Rethinking ‘Moral Panic’ for MultiMediated Social Worlds, 46 BRIT. J. SOC. 559, 560 (1995).
Although both the original model of moral panics and the reformulations which introduced notions of ideology and hegemony were exemplary interventions in their time, we argue that it is impossible to rely
on the old models with their stages and cycles, univocal media, monolithic societal or hegemonic reactions. The proliferation and fragmentation of mass, niche and micro-media and the multiplicity of voices,
which compete and contest the meaning of the issues subject to ‘moral
panic’, suggest that both the original and revised models are outdated
in so far as they could not possibly take account of the labyrinthine web
of determining relations which now exist between social groups and
the media, ‘reality’ and representation.
Id. Cohen notes that theories of social construction, media and cultural studies, and
the idea of the “risk” society followed the sociology of moral panic analysis. See
COHEN, supra note 34, at xxii–xxvi.
52
See supra notes 37–44 and accompanying text.
53
Security panic analysis is another extension of the moral panic concept. Security panic arguments explain repressive intrusions in civil liberties on perceived
threats to national security, typically from noncitizens or other outsiders. See Adrian
Vermeule, Libertarian Panics, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 871 (2005).
50
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B. Financial Moral Panic: When Financiers Become “Folk Devils”
Financial moral panic is the expression in the explicitly economic sphere of the more general form of moral panic. The public
discourse about the scandals discussed in this Article was framed in
the familiar terms of a moral panic. In this panic narrative, rogue
managers and auditors threatened public confidence in a vital public
good—the capital market—risking the solvency of every investor’s financial future. A national auto de fe against financial heresy, the con54
gressional hearings leading up to the Act opened on this tone. Consistent with popular accounts of accounting scandals, the legislative
history of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act similarly reflects the reception of
55
the blame narrative. Some witnesses did testify to the technical na-

54

In Inquisition history, the auto de fe was a public spectacle in which the Crown
and Inquisition authorities convened in the town square to discipline those who had
been convicted by Inquisition authorities for violating religious law. See JEAN PLAIDY,
THE SPANISH INQUISITION 147–59 (1967). In Spain, the auto de fe helped to consolidate a central national identity by imposing a uniform regulation across geographically and culturally disparate communities. Id. at 87–103.
55
Notice the invocation of sensationalist media accounts typical of a panic in the
opening statement of the Committee Chair, Senator Sarbanes:
The stunning collapse of Enron has cast a long and dark shadow
over our capital markets, crowding other important stories off the
business pages and creating widespread anxiety. Headlines like: “Worries of More Enrons To Come Give Prices A Pounding,” The New York
Times, January 30; and “Nervous and Scandal-Shy Investors Hold Prices
Down,” The New York Times, February 6, have become routine. The Baltimore Sun just 2 days ago has: “Investors Squeamish Amid Turmoil.”
And you can pick up virtually any paper in the country and see comparable headlines.
. . . As The Washington Post put it, if one company “issued makebelieve accounts, why should anyone believe that dozens of other companies aren’t practicing the same deception?”
Accounting Reform and Investor Protection: Hearings on the Legislative History of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Issues Raised by Enron
and Other Public Companies Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs,
107th Cong. 1–2 (2002) (opening statement of Chairman Paul S. Sarbanes) [hereinafter HEARINGS], available at http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate/
senate05sh107.html (follow “TEXT” or “PDF” hyperlinks corresponding to S. Hrg.
107-948).
Chairman Sarbanes’ focus on media triggers reflects the ongoing value of
Cohen’s point about the role of the media in a moral panic:
The student of moral enterprise cannot but pay particular attention
to the role of the mass media in defining and shaping social problems.
The media have long operated as agents of moral indignation in their
own right: even if they are not self-consciously engaged in crusading or
muck-raking, their very reporting of certain ‘facts’ can be sufficient to
generate concern, anxiety, indignation or panic. When such feelings
coincide with a perception that particular values need to be protected,
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ture of the accounting problems which underlay Enron, but these
voices were outnumbered by the gnashing of teeth over lapses in professional ethics. Imputing a simple intent to Congress’s 535 independent members often seems farfetched, but not so with respect to
the sentiment that the corporate officials and auditors in question
57
had behaved wantonly. Though stopping short of phrenology, the
the preconditions for new rule creation or social problem definition
are present.
See COHEN, supra note 34, at 7.
56
One witness explicitly warned that merely focusing on bad actors would not
resolve the structural problems with financial reporting:
You will hear or have heard many suggestions for improvement to
our system of financial reporting and audits of those financial reports.
Some will say that auditor independence rules need to be strengthened. That external auditors should not be allowed to do consulting
work and other nonaudit work for their audit clients. That external
audit firms should be rotated every 5 years or so. That oversight of
auditors needs to be strengthened. That punishment of wayward auditors needs to be more certain and swift, and so on and on. In my opinion, those suggestions, even if legislated by Congress and signed by the
President, will not fix the underlying problem.
The underlying problem is a technical accounting problem. The
problem is rooted in our rules for financial reporting. Those financial
reporting rules need deep and fundamental reform. Unless we change
those rules, nothing will change. Today’s crisis as portrayed by the
surprise collapse of Enron is the same kind of crisis that arose in the
1970’s when Penn Central surprisingly collapsed and in the 1980’s
when hundreds of savings and loan associations collapsed, which precipitated the S&L bailout by the Federal Government. There will be
more of these crisis [sic] unless the underlying rules are changed.
HEARINGS, supra note 55, at 189–90 (statement of Walter Schuetze, Chief Accountant,
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 1992–95). For example, some of what
came out in the hearings was that Enron seemingly complied with accounting requirements. Id. at 577 (prepared statement of Joel Seligman, Dean and Professor,
Washington University School of Law) (“The off balance sheet transactions that Enron employed were made in accordance with generally accepted accounting standards.”).
57
As one legal commentator put it:
Congress jumped into the Enron media circus by holding almost
thirty Enron-related media hearings within three months of that company’s bankruptcy. Those hearings in many ways resembled a
McCarthy-era witch hunt against suspected communists. Enron executives were likened to the terrorists who struck America on September
11, 2001. . . . Great theater, but such histrionics had been little seen
since Joseph McCarthy left the Senate.
Witnesses who did appear to testify were berated, badgered,
mocked, and cut off if their answers were not what the congressional
examiner wanted to hear. One member of Congress insisted on only
yes or no answers to complicated, convoluted questions that assumed a
guilty answer.
JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF MODERN U.S. CORPORATE SCANDALS: FROM
ENRON TO REFORM 93 (2005).
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floor debate from the Act contains numerous aspersions about chief
executive officers, chief financial officers, and accountants—the folk
58
devils of this financial moral panic. (Lawyers played a key role in
59
the media construction of this moral panic, confirming their complicity in feeding a moral panic which they were also in a position to
60
critically evaluate. )
However, the actual social interest at stake in the scandals rarely
appeared publicly during the Hearings. The structural interest which
these scandals really threatened was a shared “consensus reality”
about the nature of prosperity, financial value creation, and eco-

58

See 148 CONG. REC. S6734, S6750 (daily ed. July 15, 2002) (statement of Sen.
Grassley) (“We ought to be correcting the situation so that people have confidence
and so that crooks who are running our corporations and doing these things that are
evidenced here. When I say ‘crooks running our corporations,’ I mean the ones who
would do this sort of thing to their stockholders and to the country and to the economy—so that they cannot get away with that in the future.”). Blaming these individuals for the losses also required explaining these losses in moral rather than market terms, a point that I make below. See infra notes 61–87 and accompanying text.
59
Given that law professors now form part of the chattering class that comments
in the media about legal controversies, Erwin Chemerinsky’s observations on the
ethical duties of law professors in this role bear repeating:
Consider the first duty of a commentator to be competent. While
lawyers may have a sense of how ordinary criminal investigations work
and how ordinary trials are conducted, political proceedings are a hybrid of legal process and political determinations. . . .
....
There also appeared to be added pressures on commentators
to speculate on cases occurring in the political, rather than legal,
arena. . . .
....
It is more difficult in political commentary to compartmentalize
one’s opinion from legal description. Therefore, it is even more important that commentators in the political arena be aware of their biases and make full disclosure of them to the media and public.
Erwin Chemerinsky & Laurie Levenson, The Ethics of Being a Commentator III, 50
MERCER L. REV. 737, 748–50 (1999) (arguing for the adoption of a voluntary code of
ethics for legal commentators).
60
In a moral panic, lawyers can function as the disease or the cure:
The legal system, in the conventional wisdom, should be immune to
such hysteria, and indeed, should act as a rational and calming force.
All too often, however, the creation of a moral panic depends on the
complicity and active participation of the legal system. Legal actors—
police, prosecutors, defense attorneys, expert witnesses, judges, juries—
have in various ways, the power to affirmatively fuel the creation of institutionalized hysteria . . . .
Susan Bandes, The Lessons of Capturing the Friedmans: Moral Panic, Institutional Denial,
and Due Process, 2 LAW, CULTURE & HUMAN. (forthcoming 2006) (arguing that legal
actors fueled moral panic about the prosecution of Arnold and Jesse Friedman for
sexual abuse of minors).
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61

nomic stability. At present, our consensus reality about wealth rests
62
on unrealized gain as an important store of value. To some extent,
the New Deal laid the groundwork for the current “consensus reality”
in which even lower-middle class workers rest their future on unreal63
ized gain in financial assets. This view seems to have become the
61

Consensus reality explains the nature of perceived reality as the result of implicit or explicit agreement between social participants into a contract about what
the state of the world is. See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC
REVOLUTIONS 10–12 (1970) (noting how theoretical challenges to dominant paradigms are opposed by incumbent academics that stand to lose reputation by the reception of the new idea). The idea implies that the experience of reality is contingent and open to paradigm shifts.
62
For example, in a paper based on the Federal Reserve triennial survey of consumer finances, a researcher notes “a striking pattern of growth in family income and
net worth between 1998 and 2001” by offsetting the unrealized appreciation in consumers’ investment holdings against the large increase in liquidated debt of U.S.
households. See Ana M. Aizcorbe et al., Recent Changes in U.S. Family Finances: Evidence
from the 1998 and 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances, 89 FED. RES. BULL. 1, 1 (2003)
(“The level of debt carried by families rose over the period, but the expansion in equities and the increased values of principal residences and other assets were sufficient to reduce debt as a proportion of family assets.”).
63
The New Deal itself was no moral panic because the legislative remedies were
proportional to the scope of the economic crisis. Another difference is that the New
Deal deemphasized individual wrongdoing and emphasized structural reform, unlike
Sarbanes-Oxley, which focused on increasing criminal penalties for certain whitecollar offenses. In his history of the New Deal, Robert Leuchtenburg describes how
the Depression put the nation on a crash course with class consciousness by bringing
out some of the contradictions about market distribution:
The persistence of the depression raised questions not merely about
business leadership but about capitalism itself. When so many knew
want amidst so much plenty, something seemed to be fundamentally
wrong with the way the system distributed goods. While the jobless
wore threadbare clothing, farmers could not market thirteen million
bales of cotton in 1932. While children trudged to school in shoes
soled with cardboard, shoe factories in Lynn and Brockton, Massachusetts, had to close down six months of the year. . . . While people went
without food, crops rotted in the fields. . . . Western ranchers, unable
either to market their sheep or feed them, slit their throats and hurled
their carcasses into canyons. In the plains states, breadlines marched
under grain elevators heaped high with wheat.
WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL 1932–1940, at
22–23 (1963) (footnotes omitted) (analyzing Roosevelt’s role in institutionalizing
New Deal programs). Hunger and need planted the seeds of collective action:
In February 1933, thousands of former members of barter groups
seized the county-city building in Seattle. In the Blue Ridge, miners
smashed company store windows and storekeepers were given the
choice of handing out food or having it seized. Unemployed workers
in Detroit invaded self-service groceries in groups, filled their baskets,
and left without paying. Iowa leagues of the unemployed enlisted jobless gas and light workers to tap gas and electric lines. In Des Moines,
workers boarded streetcars in groups of ten or twenty and told the
cowed conductors to “charge the fares to the mayor.” In Chicago, a
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dominant way that investors conceptualize their wealth. Granted,
the most notorious of these accounting scandals, Enron’s bankruptcy,
did result in significant realized losses to shareholders, creditors, and
65
employees. Much of the most sensationalist reporting, however, re-

group of fifty-five was charged with dismantling an entire four-story
building and carrying it away brick by brick.
Id. at 25 (footnotes omitted).
64
In the 1960s a split began developing between technical analysts who measured
firm profitability with information other than net income and investors who focused
on short-term earnings. See BEAVER, supra note 5, at 4 (“In the late 1960s the perspective shifted from economic income measurement to an ‘informational’ approach.”).
Investors, however, continued to look at earnings:
Initially, American investors were concerned primarily with the net
worth, book value or physical assets of the firm. Investors then relied
on income return, dividends and yield as a measure of the firm’s worth.
Following World War II, high taxes on ordinary income and tax rates
which favored capital gains shifted investors [sic] attention from dividends to earnings. . . . During the 1960s, instant growth in earnings became the single most important indicator of a stock’s worth in the eyes
of the investment community.
Wendy Nelson Espeland & Paul M. Hirsch, Ownership Changes, Accounting Practice and
the Redefinition of the Corporation, 15 ACCT. ORGS. & SOC’Y 77, 84 (1990) (making a
hermeneutic argument that accounting methods facilitated the financial conglomerate movement of the 1960s).
65
A realized loss means the loss of an actual out-of-pocket outlay of cash or some
other liquid resource. In contrast, stock appreciation is unrealized gain until the
stock is reduced to cash through sale. “Losing” share appreciation is an unrealized
loss. To put it in another way, your consumer debt is your lender’s unrealized gain,
although collateral may reduce your lender’s market risk. See LAWRENCE REVSINE ET
AL., FINANCIAL REPORTING AND ANALYSIS 48–50, 805 (1999).
Who lost what in Enron? Enron’s ten largest shareholders lost about $11 billion
(Alliance Premier Growth, Fidelity Magellan, AIM Value, Putnam Investors, Morgan
Stanley Dividend Growth, Janus Fund, Janus Twenty, Janus Mercury, Janus Growth
and Income). MICHAEL COVEL, TREND FOLLOWING: HOW GREAT TRADERS MAKE
MILLIONS IN UP OR DOWN MARKETS 122 (2004). Several public retirement funds incurred realized losses. See, e.g., University of California, Update on the UC’s Enron
Investments and Lawsuits, http://www.universityofcalifornia.edu/news/enron/
q&a.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2006) (announcing a realized loss of $115.5 million on
shares purchased for $68.50 or $71.34 and sold for an average price of $5.33). Other
large losses (indicated here in parentheses) included the Kansas Public Employees
Retirement System (about $1 million), the City of Fort Worth Retirement Fund
(nearly $1 million), the Teacher Retirement System of Texas (realized losses of $23.3
million; unrealized losses of $12.4 million), the Georgia Teachers Retirement System
($79 million), the New York City Pension Fund ($110 million), and the Ohio State
Pension Fund ($114 million). See Turtle Trader, Hall of Shame, http://www.
turtletrader.com/hall-of-shame.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2006). For many of the
large public retirement funds, the losses were relatively insignificant as compared
with the overall fund size, indicated here in parentheses: Pennsylvania Public School
Employees’ Retirement System ($50 billion) lost $59 million, less than 0.25%; New
York State Pension Fund ($112 billion) lost $58 million; Pennsylvania State Employees’ Retirement System ($24.7 billion) lost $10.6 million; York County, Pennsylvania
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66

lated to unrealized losses. As reported in the media, the alarm over
these unrealized losses threatened the ongoing viability of the consensus reality built around unrealized gain. To recapitulate, protecting the consensus reality was the (unstated) social interest at stake in
the media construction of the scandals, the Hearings, and the Act,
67
i.e., the anxiety driver in Cohen’s model about moral panic.
In a general moral panic, though, economic anxiety is displaced
68
away from the market and onto social issues. My point in this Part

and City Employee Pension Funds ($182 million) lost $1.26 million; and the State of
West Virginia ($5.4 billion) lost $1 million. Id.
66
Enron employees who had invested in Enron stock suffered significant losses
of unrealized value, which became realized only when the employees sold their
shares later. Enron blocked these employees who had chosen to invest their shares
in Enron from selling these shares during an eleven-day period in the fall of 2001.
See Hearings on the Enron Collapse and Its Implications for Worker Retirement Security, Part II
Before the H. Comm. on Educ. and the Workforce, 107th Cong. 104 (2002) (statement of
Mikie Rath, Benefits Manager, Enron Corp.), available at http://edworkforce.house.
gov/hearings/107th/fc/fchearings.htm (follow “Serial No. 107-42 (PDF, 6.6M)” hyperlink). Enron’s retirement plan gave its staff twenty investment options, including
mutual funds, a Schwab account, and Enron stock. Id. Enron matched contributions only to its Enron stock. Id. Participants could trade the stock in their accounts
daily, with the exception of the matching contributions of Enron stock, which could
not be traded before the plan participant reached the age of fifty. Id. In the first
week of October, Enron mailed its employees a notice that, due to a change in the
plan service provider, a trading suspension would be in effect for eleven trading days,
from October 29 to November 13, 2001. Id. On October 16, 2001, Enron announced a $618 million third-quarter loss, beginning a downward price spiral in its
stock. Press Release, Enron Corp., Enron Reports Recurring Third Quarter Earnings
of $0.43 Per Diluted Share; Reports Non-Recurring Charges of $1.01 Billion AfterTax; Reaffirms Recurring Earnings Estimates of $1.80 for 2001 and $2.15 for 2002;
and Expands Financial Reporting (Oct. 16, 2001), available at http://www.enron.
com/corp/pressroom/releases/2001/ene/68-3QEarningsLtr.html. On October 10,
Enron stock was selling for $35 a share. By October 26 it had fallen to $15 and by
November 20 it had fallen to $7 per share. By the end of November, Enron stock was
selling for fewer than fifty cents a share. The lockout occurred during this price
drop. Blackout periods routinely occur when plans change service providers or when
companies merge. Such periods are intended to ensure that account balances and
participant information are transferred accurately. Blackout periods will vary in
length depending on the condition of the records, the size of the plan, and number
of investment options. While there are no specific ERISA rules governing blackout
periods, plan fiduciaries are obliged to be prudent in designing and implementing
blackout periods affecting plan investments.
67
Clearly there is a tradeoff between increasing the allocative efficiency for firms
(for example, by letting them off the hook in terms of their legal duties to their employees) and the distributional equity objective of increasing economic security for
these same employees. That conundrum drives the panic.
68
Stuart Hall noted the link between economic insecurity and moral panic. He
showed how underlying economic anxiety was displaced into an anxiety about “muggings” by black, working class men. See generally STUART HALL ET AL., POLICING THE
CRISIS: MUGGING, THE STATE, AND LAW AND ORDER (1978) (using moral panic analysis
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of the Article is to show that in a financial moral panic the economic
anxiety stays in the economic sphere but plays out in a new form. Put
another way, the logic of the financial moral panic must explain the
losses caused by the scandals without undermining the basic optimism in capital markets overall. Since indifferent markets could not
be blamed for these investment and employment losses, bad people
would have to be. A parody of Calvinist predestination, causation in
this instance explained financial losses in terms of personal morality,
not market movements, as reflected in the moral critiques of account69
ing scandals issued at the time.
In truth, a greater challenge to the current consensus reality
about unrealized wealth comes from the prevalence of economic insecurity in U.S. households, not primarily from rogue financiers.
Consider the sobering facts behind the real estate bubble. After a period of flat rates of homeownership, homeownership did increase
70
from around 60% in the early 1990s to more than 65% by 2000.
71
Home mortgage debt increased too. As the real estate price bubble
increased home equity, households converted this (unrealized) home
equity gain into liquidity by pledging their unrealized equity as col72
lateral in refinancing and equity lines of credit. At the same time,

to explain racialized construction of street crime in response to economic insecurity).
69
This statement by a political action group that advocates for middle- and working-class families is an example of a moral theory of financial loss:
Corporate scandals have taken money directly out of the pockets
of millions of Americans. The Institute for America’s Future has
found that individual retirement accounts have lost over $175 billion.
American Family Voices has determined that public pension funds
across America have lost at least $6.4 billion. And over one million
workers have lost their jobs as their looted companies tumbled into
bankruptcy. . . . While all this went on, company insiders cashed in. . . .
No wonder that working families are saying that enough is enough: we
can do better.
See American Family Voices, Corporate Recklessness Report, http://www.
americanfamilyvoices.org/pdf/cost.pdf (on file with Author). The website says that
the purpose of American Family Voices is to be “a strong voice for middle and low
income families on economic, health care, and consumer issues.” Id.
70
See Wenli Li, Moving Up: Trends in Homeownership and Mortgage Indebtedness, BUS.
REV. (Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila.), 1st Q. 2005, at 28, available at www.phil.frb.org/
files/br/brq105wl.pdf (analyzing home ownership and financing trends using consumer and banking data).
71
Id.
72
For example, in 2003, homeowners liquidated $312 billion in equity through
refinancing and equity lines of credit. See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
FDIC Outlook: In Focus This Quarter: The U.S. Consumer Sector, http://www.fdic.
gov/bank/analytical/regional/ro20044q/na/2004winter_01.html (scroll to “House-
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the subprime mortgage market grew from $35 billion in 1994 to $140
73
billion in 2001.
The net result of these trends in homeownership, refinancing,
and equity draws is that during the last thirty years, U.S. homeowners’
74
equity has actually dropped from 68.3% to 55%. Of course, financing consumption has become more expensive as the cost of living has
increased, seen most dramatically in the 350% increase between 1977
75
and 1998 in health insurance rates. During this same period aver76
age household income went up just 17%. Not surprisingly, foreclosure rates on single-family homes have increased nine-fold since the
77
1950s and threefold since the 1980s. It would seem that economic
insecurity is a staple of many U.S. households, despite the nominal
78
bubble in asset prices.
holds Use Home Equity to Increase Cash Flow”) (summarizing trends in economic
indicators reflecting consumer income, wealth, and consumption).
73
Mortgage indebtedness is measured with a loan-to-value ratio that compares
the amount of the loan with the value of the property. See generally FRANK FABOZZI &
DESSA FABOZZI, THE HANDBOOK OF FIXED INCOME SECURITIES 485 (4th ed. 1995). The
higher the ratio—i.e., the greater the amount of the loan to the property being financed—the greater the degree of the borrower’s leverage. The median loan-tovalue ratio for mortgage indebtedness rose from 15% in 1984 to over 35% in 2001.
Li, supra note 70, at 32.
74
See Javier Silva, A House of Cards: Refinancing the American Dream, DEMOS, Jan. 9,
2005, http://www.demos.org/pubs/AHouseofCards.pdf (concluding that much of
the cash flow from refinancing and equity lines of credit obtained between 2001 and
2003 went to cover living expenses and pay down consumer credit). Demos is a public policy institute that studies economic insecurity and advocates for interventions to
reduce it. See Demos - A Network for Ideas & Action, About Demos, http://www.
demos.org/page2.cfm (last visited Feb. 19, 2006).
75
John S. James, Institute of Medicine Calls for Universal Health Insurance by 2010,
AIDS TREATMENT NEWS, Jan. 15, 2004, http://www.aidsnews.org/2004/01/IOM.html.
76
Id.
77
See Peter J. Elmer & Steven A. Seelig, The Rising Long-Term Trend of Single-Family
Mortgage Foreclosure Rates 2 (Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Working Paper No. 98-2, 1998),
available at www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/working/98-2.pdf. Foreclosures increase
the risk of crime and other socially disruptive activity. See Dan Immergluck & Geoff
Smith, The Impact of Single-Family Mortgage Foreclosures on Neighborhood Crime
(Jan. 31, 2005) (conference paper, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago), available at
http://www.chicagofed.org/cedric/files/2005_conf_paper_session1_immergluck.pd
f; see also Michael Powell, A Bane Amid the Housing Boom: Rising Foreclosures, WASH.
POST, May 30, 2005, at A1 (noting recent increases in foreclosure rates in forty-seven
states, observing the disproportionate amount of foreclosures on lower-income
homeowners, and asking whether federal home ownership initiatives are hurting
rather than helping this community).
78
Financial innovation may significantly increase the fragility of firms. See
Pouncy, supra note 2, at 566. One approach to reducing the economic insecurity
imposed on others by this type of firm fragility is to build in limits to financial innovation to reduce the potential social costs of failure. Taking a different tack, my approach sees the regulation of financial risk-taking as a separate field from the human
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Against this background of ambient economic insecurity, the
narrative about rogue officers who robbed workers of their life savings is poignant but no less misleading for being so. An explanation
of these financial losses in terms of individual misconduct misses the
point. After all, it was the same accounting and business practices
here repudiated that had created much of the wealth and many of
the jobs whose evaporation had triggered the financial moral panic in
79
the first place. In fact, Enron, in particular, had become a poster
firm for “best practices” in financial engineering, associated with the
80
production of financial wealth. This poignant narrative about invesservices regulation needed to provide a safety net for investors when firms come
apart. The recommendations made in this Article do nothing to reduce the structural condition of economic insecurity. Rather, these recommendations suggest that
financial reports ought to more fully express the natural volatility involved in capital
investment instead of airbrushing risk out of financial reports. Sobering annual reports may better pierce investment euphoria than those currently allowed under financial reporting. Identifying the regulatory provisions—i.e., Social Security, education, unemployment insurance, housing benefits—to insulate vulnerable persons
from the social costs of financial innovation is beyond the scope of this Article.
However, for these recommendations to contribute more to vulnerable constituencies, provisioning for the social costs is essential.
79
No doubt, it produces cognitive dissonance to admit that one may owe her
employment security to questionable accounting practices:
Earnings management distorts the allocation of resources in the
economy, especially in periods of high financial valuations. When hiring and investment decisions are observable [in the market], bad managers hire and invest too much in order to mimic good managers.
When they are caught and forced to restate, their firms shrink quickly.
Simi Kedia & Thomas Philippon, The Economics of Fraudulent Accounting 23 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11573, 2005), available at http://pages.
stern.nyu.edu/~tphilipp/papers/sktp.pdf. See also Daniel Gross, The Crime: Slow Job
Growth. A Suspect: Enron, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2005, § 3, at 3 (suggesting that aggressive earnings management explained much of the job growth in recent years). In a
similar vein, when students in my class complain about receiving a grade they feel is
lower than deserved I am tempted to ask whether they also complain when receiving
an examination grade they feel is higher than they deserve. So far I have resisted the
temptation.
80
One commentator who put the Enron question into a market structure perspective noted that:
This story is not, however, simply about moral hazard, or a few bad
agents, but rather about the general evolution of the practices used to
define the rights to income derived from the productive assets of corporations . . . . As a leading innovator in its field, pressing into the gray
areas of corporate practice to more aggressively engineer its financial
structures, Enron provides a convenient case of best practice in modern
industrial evolution. In light of its bankruptcy this may seem unusual,
but it should be remembered that the practices which led to its collapse had previously been praised as visionary.
Eric Hake, Financial Illusion: Accounting for Profits in an Enron World, 39 J. ECON. ISSUES
595, 596–97 (2005) (emphases added).
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tor and worker losses also reflects a common misconception about
the nature of unrealized appreciation in financial assets. Again, most
of what Enron employees lost was unrealized value, which, for exam81
ple, the federal income tax laws do not tax as income. Evoking tulip
bulbs, Enron reminded us of the ephemeral nature of unrealized
82
gain, striking a chord since such gain makes up much of our wealth.
Would a retirement based on unrealized appreciation in corporate
equities be rosy? Maybe not, given the nature of market risk. John
Kenneth Galbraith argues that during a price bubble, a collective
83
psychology built on denial of financial realities sets in with investors.
The psychology leads to financial speculation and concomitant disas84
ter. Financial moral panic is a defense mechanism of this mind set.
More specifically, my point is that panics of this type deny the unavoidable underlying volatility of financial assets, of which capital
85
market investment is simply the most popular example. Moreover,
although framed in terms of class injury to Enron workers who lost
unrealized value, the class discourse around the corporate scandals
silenced other more fundamental phrasings of the economic insecu86
rity in question. Queen for a day or investor for life—how salient is
87
the difference for many?
81

The inability or unwillingness to distinguish between the loss of unrealized
value and cash losses occurred throughout the hearings. See, e.g., HEARINGS, supra
note 55, at 3–4 (statement of Sen. Richard C. Shelby) (“Unfortunately, Enron is only
the tip of the iceberg. Some experts have estimated that investors lost over $200 billion over the last 6 years due to earnings restatements and to lost market capitalization following audit failures.”); Id. at 7 (statement of Sen. Debbie Stabenow ) (“In
fact, in Michigan, the Genessee County Employees Pension Fund lost $370,000 on
Enron’s fall, and I know that there were hundreds of thousands of dollars that were
lost in other pension funds, not to mention the employees who lost their life savings.”).
82
In the 17th century, Holland was seized with a speculative investment fever
over tulips, leading to a major financial crisis there. See CHARLES KINDLEBERGER,
MANIAS, PANICS, AND CRASHES: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL CRISIS 109–11 (2000). The tulip has become the official flower of financial historians.
83
See JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, A SHORT HISTORY OF FINANCIAL EUPHORIA 1–17
(1993) (arguing that collective psychological mechanisms contribute to financial crises by, inter alia, discouraging criticism of financial speculation).
84
This psychology is the collective behavioral expression of the financial instability some scholars cite as a cause of financial innovation. See Pouncy, supra note 2, at
566–67 (analyzing Minsky’s financial instability thesis that cyclical fragility in the finance sector leads to financial innovation). Bounded rationality en masse like this
should give us pause when wondering about privatizing Social Security.
85
Airbrushed financial statements help to lull investors into this mindset.
86
E.M. Forster evokes this silenced constituency when introducing Leonard Bast,
the protagonist in Howard’s End, a class novel set in Edwardian England:
We are not concerned with the very poor. They are unthinkable
and only to be approached by the statistician or the poet. This story
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When deviants are singled out to bear the blame for structural
problems this way, it is the Left which turns to moral panic analysis to
88
contest the moral framing of the problem. While used by the sex
Left, the penological Left, and the racial Left to address conventional
89
deviancy, moral panic analysis has not been deployed by legal scholars to parse finance law. This is another expression of the tendency
in contemporary legal scholarship to match particular critical methdeals with gentlefolk, or with those who are obliged to pretend that
they are gentlefolk.
The boy, Leonard Bast, stood at the extreme verge of gentility. He
was not in the abyss, but he could see it, and at times people whom he
knew had dropped in, and counted no more. He knew that he was
poor, and would admit it; he would have died sooner than confess any
inferiority to the rich. This may be splendid of him. But he was inferior to most rich people, there is not the least doubt of it. He was not
as courteous as the average rich man, nor as intelligent, nor as healthy,
nor as lovable. His mind and his body had been alike underfed, because he was poor, and because he was modern they were always craving better food. Had he lived some centuries ago, in the brightly coloured civilizations of the past, he would have had a definite status, his
rank and his income would have corresponded. But in his day the angel of Democracy had arisen, enshadowing the classes with leathern
wings, and proclaiming, ‘All men are equal—all men, that is to say, who
possess umbrellas,’ and so he was obliged to assert gentility, lest he
slipped [sic] into the abyss where nothing counts, and the statements
of Democracy are inaudible.
E.M. FORSTER, HOWARD’S END 38–39 (Penguin Books 2000) (describing class consciousness in Edwardian England linked to an estate, Howard’s End).
87
Queen for a Day was a popular 1950s “sob show” in which working-class women
competed for having the most economically miserable life, as determined by an audience applause meter. The winning Cinderella would receive prizes and weep while
being crowned and robed. As its producer noted, “Sure ‘Queen’ was vulgar and
sleazy and filled with bathos and bad taste. . . . That was why it was so successful. It
was exactly what the general public wanted. . . . And the TV audience cried their eyes
out, morbidly delighted to find there were people worse off than they were, and so
they got what they were after.” MAXENE FABE, TV GAME SHOWS 120–30 (1979)
(quoted in Shawn Hanley, Queen for a Day (Dec. 16, 1996) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://history.sandiego.edu/gen/projects/hanley/queen.html)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
88
See COHEN, supra note 34, at xxxi:
It is obviously true that the uses of the concept to expose disproportionality and exaggeration have come from a left liberal consensus.
This empirical project is concentrated on (if not reserved for) cases
where the moral outrage appears driven by conservative or reactionary
forces. For cultural liberals (today’s ‘cosmopolitans’), this was an opportunity to condemn moral entrepreneurs, to sneer at their smallmindedness, puritanism or intolerance; for political radicals, these
were easy targets, the soft side of hegemony or elite interests.
Id.
89
See supra notes 38–44 (see cited legal scholarship applying moral panic analysis
to the social control of conventional folk devils).
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ods with substantive political projects, thereby freezing the movement
90
of a critical style across ideological camps. Moral panic analysis has,
however, no natural affinity with either the Left or the Right, given
that mobs can form anywhere along the political spectrum. So, moral
panic analysis may critique statutes which favor interests anywhere
along the majoritarian spectrum. As in any panic, a financial moral
panic is another opportunity to consider the social construction of
deviancy, although the folk devils in question may not belong to the
91
usual suspects. To the extent that it challenges popular legislation,

90

See Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1398–1403 (1996) (noting the historic divide between critical approaches such as law and economics and outsider jurisprudence). Rubin notes that there is no intrinsic antagonism between—in this
case—law and economics and alterity jurisprudence:
An obvious explanation is the divergent political predilections that
gave rise to each movement, but the correspondence between their political positions and their methodologies is not logically required. That
is, economic analysis is not necessarily the exclusive instrument of the
political right, nor deconstruction the instrument of the left; political
debate could have been carried out within either methodological
framework.
Id. at 1401–02. He looks to scholarship (as do I) as a place where academics can integrate methodologies without the bondage of history:
In fact, it is remarkable how disconnected the two movements are,
given that they have developed in the same academic institutions, published in the same scholarly journals, and shared a common concern
with law and legal institutions.
. . . Because any synthesis of these movements is likely to occur at
the level of scholarly discourse, and not at the level of substantive political positions, real possibilities for synthesis emerge primarily in this
methodological realm.
Id. at 1412. I tried doing so in Sending the Right Signals: Using Rent-Seeking Theory to
Analyze the Cuban Central Bank, 27 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 483, 484–525 (2005) (“Identifying
the governance structure of rent-seeking deals between central banks and their constituencies shows how private creditor interests impact the workings of financial regulations. To that end, using opportunism to model institutional and individual action
makes [critical] theory more relevant, especially that of liberals, progressives, and
deconstructionists on the left (island [Cuba], diaspora, and elsewhere).”).
91
Pointing out the social construction of financial elites as deviants does not suggest that all folk devils suffer equally. We know that they do not. The sociology of
law makes clear that governmental social control is regressive, falling most heavily on
the most socially and economically marginalized. See DONALD BLACK, THE BEHAVIOR
OF LAW 16–30 (1976) (expressing law as a series of postulates that describe the incidence of social control). Nor do I suggest that the financiers convicted during this
round-up had not broken some law. Given the pattern of prosecutorial retreat into
obstruction of justice charges when the evidentiary burdens of substantive offenses
were too high, the legal violations, however, may not have been of financial law.
Even financial witch hunts, though, must conform to procedural requirements. See
Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 2129 (2005) (unanimously reversing prosecution on obstruction of justice charge due to defective jury instructions).
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effective moral panic analysis is coherently (and persuasively, I think)
anti-democratic.
But where was the economic Left to object to the ideological
framing of the corporate scandals? Students of constitutional law
should be aware of the historic role of federal courts in silencing
92
proponents of Left-based radical approaches to economic insecurity.
The ongoing effect of this silencing is that the United States—unlike
many other industrialized economies—lacks a robust economic Left
from which to frame economic questions in more explicitly structural
93
terms, an ironic market failure in the marketplace of ideas. Also,
the otherwise left-leaning moral panic analysts may object less when it
94
is financiers who fall prey to social stigma.
In the absence of any meaningful opposition to the blame narrative, Congress acted accordingly. Since the evil calling for Congress’s
attention was framed as mischief by officials and auditors, the Act
ended up with a punitive rather than technical focus. The traditional
95
focus of federal securities law is disclosure. However, only three of

92

Indeed, the American judicial campaign against the economic left has been
singularly effective. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (conviction
for political organizing on behalf of the Communist Party); Abrams v. United States,
250 U.S. 616 (1919) (upholding conviction of anarchists); Debs v. United States, 249
U.S. 211 (1919) (convicting Eugene Debs for anti-war speech made after a strong
1916 run for President).
93
Today one can speak of the economic Left in the United States only apocryphally because, in terms of institutionalized economic views, our system has only a
party of the center, a party of the right, and elements of the far right. To invoke “the
left,” therefore, without explicit qualification is to move the political spectrum rightward. See Matt Bai, The Framing Wars, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 17, 2005, at 38 (profiling
Professor George Lakoff, who studies how framing of political issues affects the efficacy of political advocacy). For a prominent counterexample that attempts to institutionalize a Left perspective in the legal academy, see generally LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT
CRITIQUE (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002).
94
Brown and Halley note that a willingness to consider radical uncertainty is an
essential part of critique. Applying financial moral analysis to discourses purporting
to address distributional problems is part of a richer critique of economic life:
For part of what it means to dissect the discursive practices that organize our lives is to embark on an inquiry whose outcome is unknown,
and the process of which will be radically disorienting at times. . . . Indeed, one of our worries about legalism pertains to its impulse to call
the question too peremptorily. . . . It was through the process of subjecting political and philosophical idealism to critique that Marx found his
way to dialectical materialism and political economy, but a careful
reading of this early work makes clear that Marx did not know in advance where his critiques would take him . . . .
LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE, supra note 93, at 27.
95
See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 740 (4th ed. 2002)
(stating that “federal securities law’s exclusive focus is on full disclosure”).
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Sarbanes-Oxley’s sixty-six substantive provisions address disclosure.
Instead, criminalizing corporate and managerial activity is the overriding purpose of the Act; three titles are dedicated to fraud and
97
criminal penalties. Targeting folk devils, the Act increased the liability of the chief financial officer (CFO) by requiring the CFO to
attest to the accuracy of periodic reports under pain of criminal
98
prosecution. Moreover, by setting up the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, the Act puts auditors squarely in the sights of
the SEC, now empowered to increase its criminal and disciplinary ac-

96

In addition to the rule discussed here, Sarbanes-Oxley amended the previous
requirement that certain individuals with controlling interests in a registrant disclose
change in control transactions involving the firm. See 15 U.S.C. § 78(p) (2000 &
Supp. II 2002). Also, the law charged the SEC with rulemaking to ensure that registrants disclose whether audit committees include anyone who is a financial expert.
See id. § 7265 (Supp. II 2002). The law does provide for additional review of registrant disclosures by SEC staff, but the section does not impose a new disclosure requirement. See id. § 7266 (Supp. II 2002).
97
See Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002 § 802, Pub. L.
No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 800 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1519–20 (Supp. II 2002)) (Title
VIII of Sarbanes-Oxley); White-Collar Crime Penalty Enhancement Act of 2002
§ 903, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 805 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000 &
Supp.)) (Title IX of Sarbanes-Oxley); and Corporate Fraud Accountability Act of
2002 § 1102, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 807 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (2000 &
Supp. II 2002)) (Title XI of Sarbanes-Oxley).
98
For example, the Act requires the CFO to attest to the accuracy of the firm’s
financial reports. 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a)(2)–(3) (Supp. II 2002). It requires that:
the principal financial officer or officers, or persons performing similar
functions, certify in each annual or quarterly report filed or submitted
under either such section of such Act that—
....
(2) based on the officer’s knowledge, the report does not contain
any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading; . . .
(3) based on such officer’s knowledge, the financial statements, and
other financial information included in the report, fairly present in all
material respects the financial condition and results of operations of
the issuer as of, and for, the periods presented in the report . . . .
Id. Failure to comply with the attestation requirement exposes a chief financial officer to imprisonment for up to 20 years and fines of up to $5 million. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1350 (Supp. II 2002). The new requirements extend the chief financial officer’s
previous duty to ensure the accuracy of financial reports. See Joseph F. Morrissey,
Catching the Culprits: Is Sarbanes-Oxley Enough?, 2003 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 801, 841–44
(pointing out that chief financial officers and chief executive officers already had to
attest to the accuracy of financial reports under securities law requirements that predated Sarbanes-Oxley); Marie Leone, Command and Controllers: Sarbanes-Oxley May
Bring New Risks to the CFO’s Office, But It’s Raising the Profile of the Once-Faceless Company
Controller, CFO.COM, July 14, 2003, http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/3009814/
c_3036076?origin=archive (considering alternative reporting structures in the firm to
comply with the CFO’s new statutory liabilities).
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tion over a profession that had previously been largely self99
regulated. Again, this emphasis on individual criminality reflects
the influence of moral panic in the legislative process. Consistent
with the national mood, financiers convicted in related prosecutions
have received heavy sentences, in particular the contumaciously in100
transigent ones who refused to plea bargain.
Other prosecutions
and civil actions brought against corporate officials have also tried to
expand the concept of financial loss beyond the previous legal defini101
tion.
Constructing the problem in question in terms of corporate
99

Cf. Richard I. Miller & Michael R. Young, Financial Reporting and Risk Management in the 21st Century, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1987, 2010–17 (1997) (showing how
computer-based financial reporting creates new liabilities and defenses for auditors).
100
See 3 Sentenced for Enron Deal, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2005, at C12 (noting threeyear and ten-month sentence of Enron finance official Boyle and three-year and onemonth sentences of Merrill Lynch bankers Furst and Fuhs in earnings management
transaction); Associated Press, Adelphia Founder Gets 15-Year Term; Son Gets 20,
MSNBC.COM, June 20, 2005, http://msnbc.msn.com/id/8291040/ (discussing fifteen-year prison sentence of John Rigas and twenty-year sentence of son, Timothy
Rigas, for securities fraud involving use of cash management systems and nondisclosure of OBS transactions); Associated Press, Ex-Tyco CEO Dennis Kozlowski Found
Guilty, MSNBC.COM, June 17, 2005, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8258729 (noting that Kozlowski and his former finance chief Swartz face up to thirty years in
prison); Federal Judge Imposes Harsh Prison Sentence on Defendant Convicted After Testifying
in His Own Defense, WHITE COLLAR CRIME ALERT (Blank Rome LLP), Oct. 2005,
http://www.blankrome.com/Publications/whitecollar/WhiteCollar1004-6.pdf (suggesting a tendency of judges to impose increased punishment on defendants who
testify on their own behalf and are later convicted); Mary Flood, 2 Enron Case Figures
Avoid Long Jail Terms, HOUSTON CHRON., Apr. 22, 2005, at A1 (noting three-year and
ten-month prison sentence of Merrill Lynch banking and finance staff Brown and
Bayly); Bruce Nichols, For Former Dynegy Exec, Prison Takes Turn for Worse, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Jan. 31, 2005, at 4A (discussing transfer of Dynegy trader Jamie Olis
to medium-security prison based on his twenty-four-year sentence for a complex cash
flow arrangement that mischaracterized financing cash flow as operating cash flow);
Andrew Ross Sorkin, Ex-Banking Star Given 18 Months for Obstruction, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
9, 2004, at A1 (discussing eighteen-month prison sentence of Frank Quattrone for
obstruction of justice); Stephen Taub, Rite Aid Exec, 76, Gets 10 Years in Prison,
CFO.COM, Oct. 18, 2004, http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/3305191/c_3305215?f=
archives&origin=archive (discussing ten-year prison sentence for accounting fraud
and obstruction of justice); see generally Determining the Reasonableness of an Upward Departure in a Fraud Case, White Collar Crime Prof Blog, http://lawprofessors.
typepad.com/whitecollarcrime_blog/2005/06/upward_departur.html (June 18,
2005) (discussing United States v. Meeker, 411 F.3d 736 (6th Cir. 2005), which departed
from the fifty-one to sixty-three month prison sentence for investment fraud under
the Sentencing Guidelines to impose an eighty-four-month sentence based on thirty
letters from victims, twenty-six of which were not disclosed to the defendant).
101
See, e.g., Memorandum of Amicus Curiae United States Chamber of Commerce
Concerning Interpretation of “Loss,” United States v. Bayly, CR. No. H-03-363 (S.D.
Tex. Mar. 25, 2005) (arguing that common law and civil securities law standard for
loss should control the construction of “loss” under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines), available at http://www.uschamber.com/nclc/caselist/issues/securities.htm
(follow “View brief” hyperlink under “‘Loss Causation’ in Criminal Sentencing”).
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rogues has also dovetailed with the SEC’s self-concept as an enforcement agency, rather than as a knowledge center about capital market
102
structure.
Granted, public floggings do deter misconduct, but they are not
103
likely to solve the technical problems about financial reporting.
104
These problems continue.
Part IV offers technical recommendations for these problems which would contribute to financial trans105
But, first, I must address some of the
parency for lay investors.

Securities law does recognize a civil action for unrealized loss, but only if the disclosure of the misrepresentation caused the loss. 15 U.S.C. § 77l(b) (2000 & Supp. II
2002) (allowing an action for loss measured as “the depreciation in value of the . . .
security” resulting from a misrepresentation).
102
Consider the emphasis on enforcement from the SEC’s website discussion on
institutional mission: “Crucial to the SEC’s effectiveness . . . is its enforcement authority. Each year the SEC brings hundreds of civil enforcement actions against individuals and companies for violations of the securities laws.” U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity,
and Facilitates Capital Formation, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last
visisted March 2, 2006). Later I urge the SEC to reconsider its self-concept more in
terms of regulatory intelligence about capital market structure. See infra notes 262–
80 and accompanying text, suggesting the formation of a capital structure surveillance unit at the SEC to supplement and inform enlightened enforcement of the securities laws.
103
The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
is supposed to fix the system and force accountants to be policeman in
their audits. Does anyone seriously believe that this board will be able
to monitor the auditing of thousands of public companies to assure
that accountants are acting as policemen, rather than accountants? Of
course it cannot, but investors are still being deceived into believing
that it will. The Enron debacle and the telecom and dotcom implosions, as well as continuing scandals, by now should have removed any
doubts as to the hollowness of the assurance that full disclosure protects investors. That was an impossible dream, and Sarbanes-Oxley
only adds more smoke to this vision.
Markham, supra note 9, at 799.
104
See William H. Beaver, What Have We Learned from the Recent Corporate Scandals
That We Did Not Already Know?, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 155, 163 (2002) (analyzing
corporate scandals in the context of capital markets research on financial reporting
discretion). Professor Beaver notes how the emotional climate of the corporate
scandal has impeded a more technical approach to the issues:
At this stage, there has been a great deal of rhetoric and outrage but
relatively little analysis. There has been pressure for rapid responses in
the absence of fully understanding the causes of the problems and how
they are linked to structural defects in the financial reportingcorporate governance environment. Without these links, it is possible
that, in spite of an increase in legislation and regulation, the same
problems will reappear.
Id. at 168. See also Partnoy, supra note 18, at 1264 for a concurrence.
105
See infra notes 245–80 and accompanying text.
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technical dynamics behind the hazy moral construction outlined in
the previous Part.
II. FROM MORALIZING TO FINANCIAL TRUTH: CORRECTING THE
MYOPIA OF THE BALANCE SHEET
Many of the losses which triggered the financial moral panic involved the failure to disclose significant OBS liabilities and the related failure to book loan income as such, rather than as operating
cash flow. In other words, neither the balance sheets of these firms
nor their statements of cash flows adequately reflected the firms’ true
capital structure. Understanding why this gap developed requires
appreciating the appeal of OBS arrangements to managers, who
gravitate to the OBS sector for both fiduciary and self-serving rea106
sons. Using examples of the cash flow games played by Enron and
Dynegy, below I explain why a disclosure standard based on effective
capital structure would result in more transparency about a firm’s
risk.
A. The Discrete Charm of Off-Balance-Sheet Arrangements
The balance sheet is supposed to be a point-in-time snapshot of
a firm’s net worth and capital structure, i.e., the mixture of the debt
and equity instruments that finance the firm. Net worth is calculated
by netting the reporting firm’s claims to value against the claims of
107
others on the firm. The balance sheet “recognizes” these claims by
estimating their total value and aggregating like claims into analytically unified categories of asset claims, liability claims, and equity
108
claims. Shown on the left side of the balance sheet, “Assets” are the
firm’s claims on others. These claims are listed by declining liquid109
ity. Shown at the top of the right side of the balance sheet, “Liabili106

For a sophisticated but friendly explanation of the balance sheet, see Walter
Schuetze, What are Assets and Liabilities? Where is True North? (Accounting that My Sister
Would Understand), 37 ABACUS J. ACCT., FIN. & BUS. STUD. (2001) (emphasizing that
balance sheet values should be based on cash or cash-equivalent values).
107
See FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING
CONCEPTS NO. 6: ELEMENTS OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS (1985), available at http://www.
fasb.org/pdf/con6.pdf.
108
In accounting, “recognition” means reporting the value of an item in a financial report. See THOMAS R. DYCKMAN ET AL., INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING 36 (5th ed.
2001). Mandatory recognition is more invasive than mere disclosure. The new disclosure rule requires only disclosure, not recognition.
109
Accounting definitions sound somewhat metaphysical. “Assets are probable
future economic benefits obtained or controlled by a particular entity as a result of
past transactions or events.” STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS NO. 6,
supra note 107, at 6. Asset claims may be choses in possession, i.e., an asset claim may
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ties” are third parties’ credit claims on the firm. They are listed by
110
maturity and relative priority. The difference between “Assets” and
“Liabilities” is called “Shareholder’s Equity” and appears under the
111
“Liabilities” section in the right-hand column.
The owners’ account, shareholder’s equity is the residue that would be left for the
firm’s owners in a hypothetical liquidation after satisfaction of credi112
tors’ claims. By convention, the “Assets” equals the sum of the “Li113
The firm’s balance sheet also inabilities” and “Equity” accounts.
cludes the assets and liabilities of any other entity controlled by the
114
firm. Most registrants use the annual 10K form filed with the SEC
as their balance sheet.
be a building, or, more commonly, choses in action, such as a debt obligation against
another, requiring further action to reduce the chose to a liquid form. Liquidity
when used with regard to an asset claim—rather than to an obligor as a whole—
means the ease with which the asset may be converted into cash or its equivalent. See
generally LIQUIDITY: COMPTROLLER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 9–13.
110
“Liabilities are probable future sacrifices of economic benefits arising from
present obligations of a particular entity to transfer assets or provide services to other
entities in the future as a result of past transactions or events.” See STATEMENT OF
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS NO. 6, supra note 107, at 6. Liability entries should
also tell a reader something about a firm’s funding style. Does the firm issue long- or
short-term debt? Will its payment obligations mature over time or all at once? The
answers to these questions help a reader appreciate the funding philosophy of the
firm.
111
“Equity . . . is the residual interest in the assets of an entity that remains after
deducting its liabilities.” Id. The real value of asset and liability claims is unclear because neither is marked-to-market to reflect liquidation value. Most firms value assets
at historic cost rather than replacement cost. Firms book liabilities at par, i.e., nominal, value rather than reflecting what creditors would accept to settle the claim
(which would be a mark-to-market approach to liabilities). So the value of Shareholders’ Equity is intrinsically variable.
112
In truth, though, the varieties of accounting methods used by the balance
sheet make it hard to estimate a firm’s actual liquidation value without more detail
about assets and liabilities.
The accounting and reporting model under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles is actually a mixed-attribute model. Although most
transactions and balances are measured on the basis of historical cost,
which is the amount of cash or its equivalent originally paid to acquire
an asset, certain assets and liabilities are reported at current values either in the financial statements or related notes. For example, certain
investments in debt and equity securities are currently reported at fair
value, receivables are reported at net realizable value, and inventories
are reported at the lower of cost or market value.
See HEARINGS, supra note 55, at 561 n.13 (prepared statement of David M. Walker,
Comptroller General of the United States, General Accounting Office).
113
This is called the fundamental accounting equation. PAUL D. KIMMEL ET AL.,
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING 12 (1998).
114
Part of the OBS sector had started with an early accounting pronouncement
that clarified when a firm had to consolidate legally separate entities on its balance
sheet. AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, ACCOUNTING RESEARCH BULLETIN
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The numbers on the balance sheet matter dearly. If they hint at
illiquidity or capital shortfalls, the firm may have to pay more for
credit, face the white-hot glare of regulators, or trigger adverse contractual rights of demanding counterparties. For example, some
credit covenants let a creditor sue if the borrowing firm’s (balance
115
sheet) debt to equity ratio drops below a contractually-set point. To
mitigate these business risks, the careful manager optimizes the presentation of information on the balance sheet. For example, firms
may reclassify debt from short-term to long-term in order to improve
116
their liquidity ratios.
Shifting numerical values only in the assets
column (left-hand side), only in the liabilities column (right-hand
side), or only between the liability and the equity accounts (both on
the right-hand side) does not change the overall size of the balance
117
sheet.
To modify the size of the visible balance sheet, managers
must move off the balance sheet, using reporting discretion which is
118
customary in accrual accounting. For example, the classification of
119
operating leases is subject to significant discretion. The generalized
NO. 51: CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS (1959) (requiring consolidation of a
legally separate entity when the reporting firm had a controlling financial interest,
including majority voting interest). Consolidation eliminates the risk of surprise
from an OBS item because the reporting firm absorbs the OBS entity for reporting
purposes. The issues presented in this discussion arise with respect to unconsolidated
entities.
115
See ILEEN B. MALITZ, THE MODERN ROLE OF BOND COVENANTS 15–26 (describing
bond covenants creditors use to limit wealth expropriation by owners and managers).
116
See Jeffrey Gramlich et al., Balance Sheet Management: The Case of Short-Term Obligations Reclassified as Long-Term Debt, 39 J. ACCT. RES. 283 (2001) (documenting significant debt reclassifications of 220 firms to smooth out balance sheet liquidity and
leverage measures).
117
None of these moves disturbs the basic stability of the fundamental accounting
equation that “Assets” equals the sum of “Liabilities” plus “Equity.”
118
A prominent accounting theorist notes:
The term used in the research literature is earnings management, rather
than some pejorative phrase, such as earnings manipulation. . . . Discretion in financial reporting can be used to signal or convey additional
information management has that is not publicly available. Hence, it
may be benign rather than sinister . . . earnings management does not
necessarily imply a violation of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). There is a range of discretion within the boundaries of
judgment that is permitted, in fact required, under GAAP-based accrual accounting.
See BEAVER, supra note 5, at 163.
119
Booked off-the-balance sheet, the lease shows up in neither the asset or liability
column. But recognizing the item on the balance sheet increases book assets by the
value of the item and book liabilities by debt in respect of the lease. Constructive
capitalization better reflects a firm’s effective capital structure. See Eugene A. Imhoff
et al., Operating Leases: Impact of Constructive Capitalization, ACCOUNTING HORIZONS,
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practice of funding with OBS items leads finance practitioners to distinguish between a firm’s “book leverage” and its “financial lever120
age.” Some arrangements are hard to classify as on- or off-balance121
sheet.
Managers may seek shelter from balance sheet disclosure both
122
for fiduciary and opportunistic reasons.
Conducting a transaction
Mar. 1991, at 51 (showing effects on net income and balance sheet of constructively
capitalizing unrecorded operating leases). The Securities and Exchange Commission estimates that U.S. corporate issuers may owe as much as $1.25 trillion in noncancelable OBS operating leases. See SEC REPORT, supra note 17, at 4.
120
A fundamental aspect of capital structure, leverage is the ratio of debt financing to equity financing; in other words the extent to which owners use creditors’ resources to increase the firm’s operating base and the owners’ residual upside gain.
Financial accounting calculates “book” leverage with generally accepted accounting
principles. A more economic observer measures the firm’s effective leverage (also
called financial leverage) on the basis of actual financial power. Obviously, book and
financial leverage diverge. Finance classes teach students about financial leverage.
See RAY H. GARRISON ET AL., MANAGERIAL ACCOUNTING 796-97 (11th ed. 2006).
121
The treatment of leases is a good example of how items with potential OBS
implications were treated. The problem with a lease is that it may be a true lease or,
instead, a disguised property interest that belongs on the balance sheet. Between
1939 and 1959, the main source of accounting rules was the AICPA’s Committee on
Accounting Procedure, which produced Accounting Research Bulletins (ARB). The
AICPA first addressed lease accounting in 1949. See AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB.
ACCOUNTANTS, ACCOUNTING RESEARCH BULLETIN No. 38 (1949) [hereinafter ARB No.
38] (superseded by AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, ACCOUNTING RESEARCH
BULLETIN NO. 43: RESTATEMENT AND REVISION OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH BULLETINS
(1953)). ARB No. 38 laid down only a loosely defined standard about the problem.
Later lease accounting pronouncements refined these principles to increase the accuracy of financial reporting with respect to leases. Identifying when a lease had to
be reflected on the balance sheet, i.e., capitalized, or could be located off the balance sheet remained a contentious issue for the next forty years. See FIN.
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS NO. 13:
ACCOUNTING FOR LEASES (1976) (clarifying when leases must be capitalized on the
balance sheet); FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 23: INCEPTIONS OF THE LEASE (1978) (noting when capitalization must be done at the beginning of a lease); FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS
BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 91: ACCOUNTING FOR
NONREFUNDABLE FEES AND COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH ORIGINATING OR ACQUIRING LOANS
AND INITIAL DIRECT COSTS OF LEASES (1986) (identifying which costs need not be reflected on the balance sheet); and FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 98: ACCOUNTING FOR LEASES (1988). The issue
is still not definitively resolved.
122
It is no accident that these items are invisible. Consider this comment on the
OBS items targeted by the new disclosure rule:
The [OBS entities] that this interpretation covers are currently invisible, by design. There is no simple or reliable way for analysts or investors to judge which companies are most likely to be affected. Clues
might be found in the management’s discussion and analysis, but not
enough to enable financial statement users to reliably estimate how the
interpretation will affect companies’ financial statements. This new interpretation might cause very few changes in corporate balance sheets,
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off the balance sheet gives managers more flexibility by reducing the
discipline of oversight from creditors or owners who would be able to
123
monitor publicly-reported financial details. Common fiduciary motivations include managing the firm’s book leverage, credit rating, or
risk profile for the sake of protecting the trading value of the firm’s
124
shares.
For example, an OBS deal may boost the firm’s book in125
come without worsening the firm’s book leverage. A firm may deduct the OBS debt interest from some special purpose entities on its
federal taxes without having to report the underlying liability on its
126
balance sheet. Firms also use OBS partnerships to optimize the tax
127
value of their research and development expenditures. Segregating
a business project off-balance-sheet insulates the firm from the risk of
because companies that would have to consolidate their SPEs under
the requirements of this interpretation might already be taking steps to
shut down or sell their interests prior to the effective date. This scenario would avoid the embarrassment for the sponsors of presenting
what they never professed to own. The other alternative is that Interpretation 46(R) might cause significant adverse adjustments to companies’ balance sheets and create technical defaults in loan covenants.
Jalal Soroosh & Jack T. Ciesielski, Accounting for Special Purpose Entities Revised: FASB
Interpretation 46(R), CPA J., July 2004, at 30, 37, available at http://www.nysscpa.org/
cpajournal/2004/704/essentials/p30.htm.
123
In this sense, using OBS activities increases the value of a manager’s “switching
options” to reallocate resources between investment. Cf. George Triantis, Financial
Slack Policy and the Laws of Secured Transactions, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 35, 39, (2005) (“As a
general proposition, managers are much more prone to take actions that increase
their welfare (for example, perquisite consumption or empire building) or the welfare of their shareholders (for example, share repurchases or high-risk investments)
if they have cash at their disposal.”). The disclosure recommendations made in Part
IV may reduce the value of these options by providing more detail about cash flow to
external constituencies of the firm. See Part IV.A.
124
See generally William Beaver, Perspectives on Recent Capital Market Research, 77
ACCT. REV. 453, 466–68 (2002) (concluding that it is difficult to isolate the primary
motive for discretionary behavior by managers over reporting earnings because managers have multiple motives for such conduct). Cf. Anthony J. Luppino, Stopping the
Enron End-Runs and Other Trick Plays: The Book-Tax Accounting Conformity Defense, 2003
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 35 (arguing that accounting practices should be conformed to
tax standards to avoid characterizing transactions differently for tax and financial accounting purposes).
125
See generally Fred D. Campobasso, Off-Balance-Sheet Financing Can Generate Capital for Strategic Development, HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT., June 2000, available at http://
www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m3257/is_6_54/ai_62929196 (noting return
and liquidity advantages to using synthetic leases, sale-and-leaseback, and joint venture arrangements to finance real estate operations).
126
See David Mangefrida & E. Ray Beeman, Recent IRS Securitization Ruling Signals
Analytical Shift in Distinguishing Between Sales and Financings, INVESTMENT LAW., Oct.
1998, at 5 (explaining ability to characterize the lease as sale or financing).
127
See generally Douglas Shackelford & Terry Shevlin, Empirical Tax Research in Accounting, 31 J. ACCT. & ECON. 321 (2001); Terry Shevlin, Taxes and Off-Balance-Sheet
Financing: Research and Development Limited Partnerships, 62 ACCT. REV. 480 (1987).
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loss from the investment. Stealth funding through OBS arrangements may avoid covenants limiting investment in new business opportunities in bank loan documents, bondholder indenture agree128
ments, or a firm’s certificate of incorporation.
Such deals may,
however, violate explicit contractual duties of good faith and fair
129
dealing.
Apart from fiduciary brinksmanship for the sake of shareholders,
managers may also use an OBS arrangement for their own opportunistic ends, which may be antithetical to the interests of their principals, i.e. shareholders. When executive compensation is pegged to
balance sheet ratios such as return on assets, return on equity, and
debt-to-equity, a manager would likely prefer, all else being equal, an
OBS deal which increases his compensation by improving one of
these ratios.
Undisclosed OBS arrangements bear on conflicts between a
firm’s competing claimants, including the stockholder-bondholder
130
conflict over the firm’s exposure to financial risk.
OBS cash flow

128

Cf. In re Explorer Pipeline Co., 781 A.2d 705 (Del. Ch. 2001) (holding that corporation’s decision to enter into an OBS operating lease was not subject to a supermajority provision found in the corporation’s certificate of incorporation); see also
Samir El-Gazzar et al., The Use of Off-Balance Sheet Financing to Circumvent Financial
Covenant Restrictions, 4 J. ACC. AUDITING FIN. 217 (1989) (analyzing forty-three addenda to leases which contained debt covenants to examine how firms use OBS arrangements to modify covenant-based restrictions).
129
For example, a court has been unwilling to expand the concept of good faith
with respect to balance sheet debt. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716
F. Supp. 1504, 1507–08 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (rejecting plaintiff’s request to imply a covenant of good faith and fair dealing into a bond indenture which did not impose debt
limits on the defendant-issuer). The use of OBS debt, however, may warrant wider
consideration for a creditor, although careful bond counsel would draft covenants
taking into account the existence of OBS items.
130
Bondholders enjoy legal priority over stockholders to only a liquidated
amount, i.e., the principal and interest on the bonds in question. See MALITZ, supra
note 115, at 3–4 (explaining the conflict of interest between creditors and owners of
a corporation). Stockholders recover only after satisfaction of these liquidated
claims, but they keep whatever is left over, i.e., the residual upside. These adverse
rights lead to a class conflict in the corporation over risk and investment: stockholders may prefer a low probability, high investment return because they collect the residue; contra, bondholders may prefer a high probability, low investment return because they get paid first and gain nothing from risk in excess of what is required for a
return of their capital. When OBS liabilities increase the residual upside, these liabilities let the firm leverage the bondholders’ money free of the contractual protections for which the bondholders bargained. This is the private firm version of the
financing moral hazard in banks. See infra note 185. Conversely, OBS assets may inure to the benefit of the bondholder to the extent that the OBS asset may be used to
fund the bondholder’s fixed claim on firm assets.
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may also increase existing agency costs for shareholders.
Management accounting will carefully monitor these arrangements to the extent that they are material to the decisions faced by a firm’s manag132
ers.
Some firm outsiders such as institutional creditors may also
133
bargain for this type of information. Financial databases, an important public source of firm-level information, however, usually lack
134
much information about OBS items.
To illustrate the motivations that lead corporate officials to use
OBS arrangements, the next section discusses cash flow games used
by two companies implicated in the accounting controversies that led
to the Act, Enron and Dynegy.
B. Cash Flow Games
The purpose of this particular Enron strategy was for Enron to
receive liquidity from a bank without increasing the firm’s financial
131

Cash flow from an OBS item intensifies the agency problem over free cash flow
because it is harder for corporate stakeholders to monitor activities sourced off-thebalance sheet. The new OBS disclosure rule could reduce the agency costs for the
shareholder if the disclosure helps to monitor the agent’s opportunism by revealing
the nature of the free cash flow more accurately. Cf. George G. Triantis, Organizations
as Internal Capital Markets: The Legal Boundaries of Firms, Collateral, and Trusts in Commercial and Charitable Enterprises, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1102 (2004) (modeling a firm as
an internal capital pool in which legal restrictions on liquidity restrict managerial
discretion, including the freedom to consume perquisites). So, apart from the opportunity cost of liquidity, i.e., foregone investment return, restraining managers’
opportunism is a governance reason why shareholders might prefer to limit a firm’s
liquidity. For an empirical analysis of how free cash flow impacts managerial decision-making, see John Paul Broussard et al., CEO Incentives, Cash Flow, and Investment,
FIN. MGMT., July 1, 2004, at 51 (analyzing different incentives for chief executive officers to encourage them to invest excess cash flow for the benefit of shareholders).
132
To the extent that OBS items may impact the firm, its management accounting
will track the risk. See GARRISON ET AL., supra note 120, at 9:
Financial accounting is mandatory; that is, it must be done. Various
outside parties such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
and the tax authorities require periodic financial statements. Managerial accounting, on the other hand, is not mandatory. A company is
completely free to do as much or as little as it wishes. No regulatory
bodies or other outside agencies specify what is to be done, or, for that
matter, whether anything is to be done at all. Since managerial accounting is completely optional, the important question is always, “Is
the information useful?” rather than, “Is the information required?”
Id. If the information is useful to the firm’s managers, ought it not be revealed to
investors and other market intermediaries?
133
See Raghuram Rajan & Andrew Winton, Covenants and Collateral as Incentives to
Monitor, 50 J. FIN. 1113 (1995).
134
See Imhoff et al., supra note 119, at 63 (finding that financial databases of Dun
and Bradstreet, Value Line, and Compact Disclosure did not reflect the value of legally binding OBS operating lease commitments in firms’ financial information).
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ratios by having to report a liability on the Enron balance sheet. At
this time, Enron needed to maintain its credit standing to avoid a
136
negative funding spiral. If its credit rating were to drop, some energy trading counterparties would stop dealing with the firm, depriv137
ing it of operating cash flow. Worse still, if Enron’s credit dropped
below investment grade, trading counterparties would demand more
collateral (taxing liquidity further), the interest cost of some variable
rate debt would increase, some payment obligations would become
accelerated, and Enron would be locked out of the commercial paper
138
market, hence worsening the firm’s illiquidity spiral.
Finessing these funding demands with its financial reporting duties, Enron arranged a series of “prepays” which gave the firm more
139
than $8 billion in financing over six years.
Given their true economic nature as loans, Enron ought to have reported the prepays as
bank loans on its balance sheet that generated financing cash flow—
135

Many of Enron’s solvency problems dealt with how the firm financed its transformation from an energy company to a derivatives trading platform in which—
towards the end—ninety percent of firm revenues came from trading in increasingly
esoteric financial derivatives like bandwidth and pollution-emission credits. See
Ronald Fink, Beyond Enron: The Fate of Andrew Fastow and Company Casts a Harsh Light
on Off-Balance-Sheet Financing, CFO, Feb. 2002, available at http://www.findarticles.
com/p/articles/mi_m3870/is_2_18/ai_83045541.
136
As has been noted:
Enron was acutely aware of the importance of its credit ratings. In its
1999 annual report, Enron management stated that the company’s
“continued investment grade status is critical to the success of its
wholesale business as well as its ability to maintain adequate liquidity.”
. . . An investment grade rating was needed not only to keep down
credit costs but also because various trigger provisions for support of
[off-balance sheet entities] would be activated in the event of a ratings
downgrade.
See MARKHAM, supra note 57, at 100.
137
See The Role of the Financial Institutions in Enron’s Collapse, Before the Permanent
Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,
107th Cong. 220 (2002) (prepared statement of Robert L. Roach, Counsel & Chief
Investigator, Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations), app. A, Accounting Treatment of
Prepays: Effect of Enron’s Financial Statement, at A-2 to A-4 [hereinafter Accounting
Treatment of Prepays], available at http://www.gpo.gov/congress/senate/
senate12sh107.html (Click “TXT” or “PDF” links under “S. Hrg. 107-618 — The Role
of the Financial Institutions in Enron’s Collapse”).
138
Id. at A-5.
139
See The Role of the Financial Institutions in Enron’s Collapse, Before the Permanent
Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,
107th Cong. 16 (2002) (prepared statement of Robert L. Roach, Counsel & Chief Investigator, Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations) [hereinafter Role of the Financial
Institutions], available at http://www.gpo.gov/congress/senate/senate12sh107.html
(Click “TXT” or “PDF” links under “S. Hrg. 107-618 — The Role of the Financial Institutions in Enron’s Collapse”). Of this amount, Chase Manhattan Bank provided
$3.7 billion and Citigroup provided $4.8 billion. Id.
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rather than operational cash flow—on the statement of cash flows.
Had Enron reported the prepays this way, credit ratios which determined the firm’s ongoing credit access would have deteriorated. Indeed, the debt-to-equity ratio would have risen from about 69% to
about 96%, and the debt-to-total-capital ratio would have increased
141
from about 40% to 49%.
142
The mechanics of the transaction are a bit more complicated.
Again, Enron wanted to borrow money without reporting a loan on
its balance sheet. So Enron structured the deal as a pair of commodities trades. The would-be lender—in this case, the bank—wanted to
make a loan but did not want to speculate in commodities. Ordinarily Enron would reflect a loan from a bank on the firm’s balance
sheet as a liability and report the cash inflow on the firm’s statement
of cash flows as a financing cash flow. But another of Enron’s preferences about this transaction was to keep the firm’s debt-to-equity ratio
as low as possible (lenders will charge more to lend to a firm with a
high debt-to-equity ratio). Of course, an accounting question arises
as to whether these arrangements are a trade or a loan, which would
143
entail adverse balance sheet consequences.
In order to avoid classifying the transaction as a loan, Enron in144
serted a sham counterparty between Enron and the bank.
In this
way, Enron converted the loan from the bank into two sales contracts.
In the deal, the bank would “buy” a fixed amount of commodities
from the sham counterparty. Next, Enron would “sell” that same
amount of commodities to the sham counterparty. So far these were
two commodity contracts with only incidental credit risk (although
the net effect of the deal was that Enron had sold commodities to the
bank).
In order to keep the bank from bearing the commodity price
145
risk in the sales, Enron also entered into a swap with the bank. In
the swap, the bank would exchange the market value of the com-

140

Id. at 14.
Id. at 17. See also Accounting Treatment of Prepays, supra note 137, at A-4.
142
See Second Interim Report of Neal Batson, Court Appointed Examiner at 58–
67 & app. E, In re Enron Corp., No. 01-16034 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 2003), available at http://www.enron.com/corp/por/examiner2.html.
143
A loan compensates the lender for credit risk and the commodity value of
money. A trade compensates the trader for price risk in the commodity. Settlement
does expose a trader to the counterparty’s credit risk incidentally, but it is the (upside) commodity price risk and not the counterparty credit risk which induces the
risk-taking.
144
See Role of the Financial Institutions, supra note 139, at 14–15.
145
Id.
141
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modities for the price agreed to in the original sale to the counter146
party. If the price of the commodities had decreased (by the time
the bank went to sell the commodities) the swap made the bank
147
whole at the original prices.
If the price of the commodities had
increased (by the time that the bank went to sell the commodities)
the swap terms required the bank to transfer that upside to Enron,
148
which would give the bank only the original fixed prices. Using the
OBS swap, thus gave the bank the credit risk which it wanted without
149
Why would the bank
exposing the bank to commodity price risk.
enter into this deal? The bank wanted and received the loan interest
and fees from what was really an effective loan.
Another energy company (and Enron trading counterparty),
Dynegy, also used creative accounting to turn financing into operational cash flow, at least as a financial reporting matter. In 2001, securities analysts compared Dynegy’s accrual-based earnings with its operating cash flow and concluded that the operating cash flow did not
150
seem to sustain the share price of Dynegy stock.
The company
needed more operating cash flow to support the trading price of its
151
stock.
To reassure (and mislead) its critics, Dynegy generated
phantom operational cash flow using OBS arrangements that were
152
later deemed loans as a matter of law. As with the Enron prepays,
the disclosure of loan rather than operating cash flow (i.e., effective
capital structure) would have depressed Dynegy’s share price, reduced the firm’s credit access, and triggered a negative funding spiral
like the one described above for Enron. As part of the SEC’s order to
institute cease-and-desist proceedings, Dynegy agreed to restate its
2001 financial statements to more accurately reflect the firm’s effec153
tive capital structure.

146

Id.
See id.
148
See id.
149
See id. at 15.
150
See Katrina M. Miltich, A Slap on the Wrist: Dynegy, Inc. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 28 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 983, 984–85 (2003) (reviewing
the facts and major legal issues in the Dynegy matter).
151
See In re Dynegy Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-46537 (Sept. 25, 2002),
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr17744.htm.
See generally
Miltich, supra note 150, at 983.
152
James Olis, the financier who designed the arrangement, now faces a twentyfour-year sentence. See Nichols, supra note 100.
153
See Miltich, supra note 150, at 986.
147
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C. The Materiality of Effective Capital Structure
Given the gap, then, between the foreseeably misleading financial reports prepared by managers and the realties of the cash flow
games which these reports seek to address, what should financial reporting law do? Mapping a firm’s effective capital structure is the
counter-move to the earnings management practices made possible
by the accounting discretion. So, financial reporting law should encourage more comprehensive measurement of a firm’s effective capi154
tal structure.
This would mean reflecting more of a firm’s volatility
in messier financial reports. Like the shadows in Plato’s allegory
about the cave, public financial reports can only convey a highly selective approximation of a firm’s financial reality, but increased re155
ported volatility would be more accurate.
The existing literature on effective capital structure focuses on
mapping effective debt, although understanding effective equity be156
longs to effective structure analysis too.
All effective debt analysis
157
For example,
involves reconstructing the whole from the part.
much like proving the existence of a black hole by observing its gravitational pull on matter, effective debt can be backed out by comparing income tax returns (which claim business interest deductions

154

A suggestion made during the SEC’s administrative rule-making about OBS
items epitomizes what effective capital structure is:
The Management Discussion and Analysis should provide a pro forma
capital structure showing the full effects of all off balance sheet financing entities. The common stock equity of the company should be recast to show the pro forma level of common equity that exists once the debt
related aspects of the special purpose entity are factored in. . . .
. . . The Management Discussion and Analysis should also show the
potential effects that imputed debt service from the special purpose entity may have on the covenants in the various financing agreements for
the company. . . . [T]he full effects should be shown.
See Letter from Kevin M. Bronner, Ph.D, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary of the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (Nov. 13, 2002), available at http://sec.gov/
rules/proposed/s74202/kmbronner1.htm (emphases added).
155
Apart from any limitations in the reports themselves, public disclosures are
only as complete as their underlying markets: “Given that many of the assets and
claims reported on the financial statements are represented by imperfect or incomplete markets, . . . . the ‘ideal’ that financial statements are attempting to represent is
not clear conceptually.” BEAVER, supra note 5, at 4. For an explanation of Plato’s allegory about bounded rationality, see S. Marc Cohen, The Allegory of the Cave,
http://faculty.washington.edu/smcohen/320/cave.htm (last updated July 8, 2002).
156
The federal government’s position as a stand-by source of equity capital to bail
out insured depositors of failed banks is an example of effective equity.
157
The forensic accounting exercises which Congressional subcommittees engaged in when reconstructing Enron’s effective balance sheet are an example of effective debt analysis. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
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from both “book” and effective liabilities) and the balance sheet
158
(which includes only “book” debt). Undisclosed debt exists to the
extent that the tax interest deductions suggest debt greater than the
159
book debt.
Debt rating agencies approximate effective capital
structure when considering the impact of OBS items on a credit rat160
ing. Capitalizing OBS leases into the equity account rather than as
161
a liability may better reflect the all-in cost of OBS items. Investors,
though, lack the time and resources needed to infer true capital
structure.
Comprehensively measuring cash flow is a key aspect of effective
capital structure. A firm manages its day-to-day liquidity on the basis
162
of financial cash flow. Though valuable, financial cash flow is hard
to square with the balance sheet and the income statement, which
163
use different accounting methods to present financial information.
158

One team of researchers inferred the level of OBS debt by comparing public
firms’ SEC filings with their federal income taxes. Lillian F. Mills & Kaye J. Newberry, Firms’ Off-Balance Sheet Financing: Evidence from their Book-Tax Reporting
Differences (January 5, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=49474 (later
published as Lillian F. Mills & Kaye J. Newberry, Firms’ Off-Balance Sheet and Hybrid
Debt Financing: Evidence from their Book-Tax Reporting Differences, 43 J. ACCT. RES. 251
(2005)).
159
Id.
160
These OBS factors include: operating leases, pension obligations, debt of joint
ventures and unconsolidated subsidiaries, guarantees, receivables that have been factored or sold with recourse, potential legal judgments or settlements of lawsuits, and
other contingent liabilities, including environmental cleanup liabilities. STANDARD
AND POOR’S, CREDIT POLICY UPDATE: FACTORING OFF-BALANCE SHEET FINANCING INTO
THE RATINGS PROCESS 1–2 (April 15, 2002) (on file with author) (reviewing Standard
and Poor’s rating criteria for off-balance sheet items) (available to registered Standard and Poor’s users at http://www.standardandpoors.com). As per the Efficient
Capital Markets Hypothesis (ECMH), it is specialized intermediaries that first analyze
raw financial data and then internalize it by buying or selling securities in the open
market or preparing market intelligence for use by other investors. The market internalizes the information as trading prices begin to internalize the information.
Debt rating agencies serve this function for OBS items by treating operating lease
expenses as a permanent part of a firm’s effective capital structure.
161
See Steve C. Lim, Steven C. Mann & Vassil T. Mihov, Market Evaluation of Off
Balance Sheet Financing: You Can Run but You Can’t Hide 2 (Dec. 1, 2003), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=474784 (comparing the impact of OBS operating lease financing on a firm’s debt cost for 6800 U.S. issuers).
The study examined whether credit ratings reflected this aspect of the firms’ effective
capital structure. Id. The authors compared two valuation approaches to the OBS
items: treating the OBS item as a current liability or as permanent part of the company’s capital. Id. They concluded that the perpetuity approach resulted in a higher
actual cost, which better reflected the true cost of the leases. Id.
162
Cash is fungible. From a cash management perspective, then, it makes no difference whether a cash inflow or outflow arises on or off the balance sheet.
163
The main reporting formats are: the balance sheet, the income statement, the
statement of changes in equity, and the statement of cash flows. See generally
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Examples like the cash flow games played by Enron illustrate the gap
between tracking financial cash flow and reported cash flow. Instead
of financial cash flow, the statement of cash flows reflects accounting
cash flow, the best publicly available proxy for a firm’s financial cash
164
flow. Tracking accounting cash flow has many virtues, as shown by
the SEC’s wide use of this technique to explain the OBS sector to
165
166
Congress, the use of cash flow to measure firm profitability, the
DYCKMAN ET AL., supra note 108, at 118–219. For a good summary of these financial
reports (including the statement of cash flows), see SEC REPORT, supra note 17, at
11–14. These reports may use historical price information or current market values
to price assets, may calculate asset and liability values using either cash methods or
accrual methods, typically make no adjustment for the time value of money when
considering cash flows in different periods, and, finally, may use different probability
thresholds to determine whether an item needs to be disclosed at all. At best, these
varied measures can provide only an impressionistic rendering of the dynamically
shifting financial values that make up a firm. In this sense, cash flow intrudes into
the neat formalisms of forward projection and financial reporting.
164
Accounting cash flow refers to a public representation of a firm’s financial cash
flow that conforms to generally accepted accounting principles. Ongoing debates
about the advantages of a cash-flow tax rather than an income tax refer to accounting cash flow. See Chris Edwards, Replace the Scandal-Plagued Corporate Income Tax with
a Cash-Flow Tax, in AFTER ENRON: LESSONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY 283 (William Niskanen
ed., 2005) (Edwards argues that cash-flow tax would eliminate many of the current
distortions of corporate income caused by the income tax).
165
In its statutorily required (15 U.S.C. § 7261) report, the SEC stressed the reporting value of cash flow: “What presents difficulties for investors, as well as the
market as a whole, is a lack of information about potential positive and negative cash
flows.” See SEC REPORT, supra note 17, at 5. The Report also used cash flow scenario
analysis throughout. See id. at 59 (using cash flow scenario analysis to estimate the
value firm’s obligations under employee defined-benefit plans); id. at 65 (estimating
the value of cash flows from capital leases); id. at 67 (using cash flow scenario analysis
to estimate the value of contingent obligations); id. at 89 (using cash flow to measure
the impact of purchase and sale obligations of filers).
166
See BEAVER, supra note 5, at 5 (noting the trend in security valuation away from
earnings measurement and towards discounted cash flow valuation). A 1994 survey
of chief financial officers reported a moderate increase (54% to 62%) of officers who
made maximizing cash flow a top priority from a previous survey. CFO Forum: King
Cash, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR (AM. ED.), Sept. 1994, at 93. Increasingly, CFOs use
cash flow based measures to determine employee compensation. See STEPHEN GATES,
CFO 2000: THE GLOBAL CFO AS STRATEGIC BUSINESS PARTNER 13 (Conference Bd.
1998) (conducted interviews and surveys of chief financial officers regarding composition of the CFO function). Chief financial officers have called for increased use of
cash flow in earnings rather than net income. See Barney Jopson, CFO Urges Cashflow
as New Measure, FINANCIAL TIMES (London, England), Apr. 21, 2005, at 22. Some
theorists agree. See Pablo Fernández, Cash Flow Is a Fact. Net Income Is Just an
Opinion 1 (Mar. 18, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=330540 (“A company’s net income is a quite arbitrary figure obtained after assuming certain accounting hypotheses regarding expenses and revenues. On the other hand, the cash flow
is an objective measure, a single figure that is not subject to any personal criterion.”).
Some qualify the value of cash flow information over accrual earnings by pointing
out that cash flow data is more relevant for firms experiencing rapid growth or de-
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167

use of cash flow analysis by credit agencies, and the pedagogical
168
value of cash analogies. Of course, uncertainty limits the ability to
169
project future cash flow. The statement of cash flows nets cash inflows and cash outflows for a time period between two balance
170
171
sheets.
The statement does not reflect accrual losses or gains.
cline, but that accrual earnings say more about a firm during a steady period of the
firm’s life. See Divesh Shankar Sharma & Errol Iselin, The Decision Usefulness of Reported Cash Flow and Accrual Information in a Behavioral Field Experiment, 33 ACCT. &
BUS. RES. (U.K.) 123 (2003) (noting that information about a firm’s cash flows may
be useful only for a firm facing solvency problems).
167
Reflecting the value of cash flow analysis, credit rating agencies note the importance of cash flow in their rating decisions. See Hearings on the Current Role and
Functions of Credit Rating Agencies in the Operation of the Securities Markets Before the Securities and Exchange Commission 113 (Nov. 15, 2002) (testimony of Leo C. O’Neill, President, Standard & Poor’s), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/extra/credrate/
credrate111502.txt (“The information that we get, in most cases, is corporations,
projections, call it what you will, their view of their future cash requirements, how
their capital spending is going to go, what their cash flow is going to be to support
that . . . .”).
168
Analogizing to cash also helps to explain some income tax concepts. Students
seem to find it easier to understand cash consideration than other forms of property.
When explaining the tax implications of a transaction with noncash consideration, I
encourage students to restate the consideration on both sides as cash and to analyze
the issue restated that way. The tax effects of the notional cash exchange will generally mirror the tax effects of the actual noncash transactions. For example, to simplify the analysis in the case, restate as cash the consideration in Philadelphia Park
Amusement Co. v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 184 (Ct. Cl. 1954), which addresses income recognition and basis for taxable exchanges.
169
As Beaver notes:
A common approach to valuation of complex claims under uncertainty
is to take a valuation model derived from certainty, such as the discounted cash flow model, and to replace each variable in that formula
with the expected value of that variable to reflect the uncertainty . . . .
In a multiperiod setting, characterizing the present value or price of a
complex claim in terms of discounting expected cash flow [under uncertainty] at expected rates of return is not possible in general.
See BEAVER, supra note 5, at 60–61; id. at 49 (noting the Financial Accounting Standards Board’s preference for accrual earnings over cash flow).
170
Cash flow discounting may actually refer to any of ten different methodologies
for valuation. See Pablo Fernández, Equivalence of Ten Different Methods for Valuing
Companies by Cash Flow Discounting, 1 INT’L J. FIN. EDUC. 141, 142–43 (2005), available
at http://www.senatehall.com/getfile.php?file=paper140.pdf (identifying ten alternative cash flow discounting methods).
171
Accrual accounting records resource inflows and outflows based not on actual
cash flows, but instead on the basis of whether a firm’s legally-enforceable rights (or
obligations with respect to outflows) have vested. See DYCKMAN ET AL., supra note 108,
at 33–34. A firm’s statement of income identifies what the firm’s net profit or loss
position was during a specific period, typically one year’s economic activity. The income statement provides a bridge between a firm’s balance sheet at the beginning of
the period in question and the balance sheet at the end of the reporting period. A
typical income statement reflects various different measures of income, typically accrual income plus other adjustments. Some measures try to reconcile accrual earn-
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Rather, it reflects only accounting cash outflows and inflows.
The
statement lets a reader compare accrual-based earnings or balance
sheet values with accounting cash flow, sourced on- or off-balancesheet. Any single financial indicator has its limits and this is also true
173
for measures that track cash flow. Publicly revealing more about financial cash flow would lead to the appearance of volatility for
174
firms. Part IV recommends changes to make the statement of cash
ings with cash flow by adding back to accrual earnings accounting adjustments that
do not reflect actual funds outlays. For example, accounting goodwill is a wasting
asset for which a firm “accounts” by allocating a portion of the deemed waste in
goodwill in each accounting period, i.e., amortization of goodwill. So, since accrual
earnings reflect the amortization of goodwill, all else being equal, they will be lower
than actual cash earnings for the same period. One approach to reconcile book
earnings to cash flow is to add back the amount of amortized goodwill to the accrual
amount.
172
An accrual loss would occur when the ultimate value of an asset or receivable
turns out to be less than its book value. See generally DYCKMAN ET AL., supra note 108,
at 40–41. Assume that a firm books an account receivable on the asset side of its balance sheet for $100. If the firm collects only $80 on the account, the deficit gives rise
to an accrued loss reflected only on the income statement. The statement of cash
flows would reflect an operating inflow of $80. Conversely, if a firm collects $120 in
exchange for investment securities booked on the asset side of the balance sheet for
$100, the firm books a gain in the income statement of $20. The amount reflected as
an investment cash flow is $120.
173
Accrual accounting makes possible the economic matching of the expenses
and revenues from a project. See BEAVER, supra note 5, at 2 (“Reporting cash receipts
and cash disbursements will not properly match, and some form of accrual accounting is called for.”). See also Cunningham, supra note 1, at 928 (noting limitations of
cash flow reporting).
174
Agreeing with this view, an accounting study group considering the future balance sheet urged more cash flow-based analysis and disclosure, despite the resulting
appearance of volatility:
The balance sheet of the future will be a more flexible instrument,
able to adapt to a wide variety of industries and circumstances. . . .
. . . [It] would permit the display of different kinds of numbers—
either in a range, or presented as alternatives. This approach could be
used to portray cash transactions for which audit assurance is highest,
the historical cost allocations of prior cash transactions, [and] market
values from actual arms’-length transactions . . . .
. . . [W]e recognize that financial reports prepared in this fashion
would appear to be considerably more volatile, complex and subjective
than the financial reports we are accustomed to scrutinizing today. . . .
. . . [I]t is the illusion of exactitude that carries with it the false perception that financial reports are relatively stable and easily comparable. . . . [We] believe the current emphasis on reducing volatility, complexity, and subjectivity and on seeking a greater degree of
comparability needs tempering. The world, the economy, and the
business environment are in a constant state of flux and any financial
reporting system that tries to distill all the data contained in increasingly complex financial statements into one verifiable, static number
such as GAAP EPS [earnings per share] flies in the face of reality.
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flows more useful as a public financial report by reflecting volatility,
which is currently airbrushed out of the statement.
The statement of cash flows was the last major financial report to
175
become widely used by firms. Ever reactive on accounting matters,
the SEC began to mandate the disclosure of cash flow information by
firms for the first time after an agency study recommended the man176
datory disclosure of accounting cash flow. During this same period
AM. ASSEMBLY, COLUMBIA UNIV., THE FUTURE OF THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION 11,
available
at
http://www.americanassembly.org/programs.dir/report_file.dir/
accounting_report_report_file_future%20of%20the%20accounting%20profession
%20report%20final.pdf.
175
At the time of the New Deal, firms did not use the statement of cash flows
widely, although accounting teachers had thought of a statement of the sources and
uses of funds, and some firms were already voluntarily disclosing liquidity information. See Karl Käfer & V.K. Zimmerman, Notes on the Evolution of the Statement of Sources
and Applications of Funds, 1 INT’L. J. ACCT. EDUC. & RES. 89–121 (1965) (tracing statement from emergence in the early 1900s through the early 1960s in UK and USA;
the book contains an anthology of essays tracing the development of public financial
reporting). Large railroad concerns were the first to include these statements in
their financial statements. Id. A turn-of-the-century financial columnist, Thomas
Warner Mitchell, was probably the first to publish systematic analyses of the sources
and uses of funds by companies in the United States. See CORPORATE FINANCIAL
REPORTING AND ANALYSIS IN THE EARLY 1900S 191-215 (Richard P. Brelf ed., 1986)
(analyzing liquidity changes by the International Paper Company, the Tennessee
Coal, Iron, and Railroad Company, and the Chicago and Alton Railroad Company).
See also Cunningham, supra note 1, at 216–20 (discussing the development of the
cash flow statement in the United Kingdom and Germany). Voluntary disclosures of
cash flow information seems to be a pattern elsewhere too. See Christian Leuz, The
Development of Voluntary Cash Flow Statements in Germany and the Influence of International
Reporting Standards, 52 SCHMALENBACH BUS. REV. 182 (2000) (showing how German
firms voluntarily reported cash flow information before any legal requirement to do
so). U.S. Accounting authorities started requiring a statement of cash flows in 1971.
For a comprehensive survey of cash flow products—especially in the United Kingdom—see T.A. LEE, TOWARDS A THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CASH FLOW ACCOUNTING
(1986) (reviews history of cash flow accounting, accounting for goodwill and enterprise income, and the use of cash flow accounting to track firm profitability).
176
In 1971, the Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants issued Opinion 19, recommending the inclusion of a “Statement of Changes in Financial Position” in a firm’s financial statements. AM. INST. OF
CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BOARD OPINION NO. 19:
REPORTING CHANGES IN FINANCIAL POSITION (1972). The main objective of Opinion
No. 19 was to “summarize the financing and investing activities of the entity, including the extent to which the enterprise has generated funds from operations during
the period.” Id. at ¶ 4 (quoted in J.W. Giese & T.P. Klammer, Achieving the Objectives
of APB Opinion No. 19, J. ACCOUNTANCY, Mar. 1974, at 54–55). Research conducted
after the adoption of Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 19 found substantial
noncompliance with the requirements. See Giese & Klammer, supra, at 54, 57 (concluding from a financial reporting study of fifty Fortune 500 firms that one-half of
the firms did not properly label the sources and uses of funds). German firms also
failed to comply with cash flow reporting requirements after it became a duty to
make the disclosures. See Günther Gebhardt & Aaron Heilmann, Compliance with

GABILONDO FINAL.DOC

826

3/6/2006 4:42:16 PM

[Vol. 36:781

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW
177

cash flow became a popular way of valuing the firm.
In 1985, the
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) began to adopt cash
flow valuation for selected situations, starting with the treatment of
178
pensions. Only in 1987 did FASB require the disclosure of accounting cash flow in a firm’s financial reports. Beginning in that year,
firms had to report cash flow classified according to whether it was re179
180
181
lated to operating, investing, or financing activity, a classification to which I return in my recommendations.
German and International Accounting Standards in Germany: Evidence From Cash Flow
Statements, in THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF ACCOUNTING 218 (Leuz et al. eds.,
2004) (documenting that a majority of firms failed to report operating, investing,
and financing cash flows as required by IAS7, the cash flow standard of the International Accounting Standards Board, and GAS2, the German accounting standard on
cash flow). One reason for the belated recognition of cash is the accounting profession’s historic preference for measures based on accrual earnings over cash flow indicators as a measure of firm value. See FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT
OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS No. 1: OBJECTIVES OF FINANCIAL REPORTING BY
BUSINESS ENTERPRISES ¶ 44 (1978), available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/con1.pdf.
“Information about enterprise earnings and its components measured by accrual accounting generally provides a better indication of enterprise performance than does
information about current cash receipts and payments.” Id. This subordination of
cash flow to accrual measures has hindered the comprehensive financial reporting of
a firm’s balance sheet and OBS sectors.
177
For an example of how law has incorporated cash flow analysis, consider how
judges in Delaware dissenter’s appraisal proceedings rely on cash flow discounting.
See generally Joseph Evan Calio, New Appraisals of Old Problems: Reflections on the Delaware
Appraisal Proceeding, 32 AM. BUS. L.J. 1 (1994) (documenting the increase in use of
cash flow discounting by judges since a 1983 case authorized the use of any generally
accepted financial valuation technique).
178
See Siegel, supra note 29, at 1851 (noting the adoption of cash flow valuation by
the Financial Accounting Standards Board for pensions in 1985 and employee benefit plans in 1990). The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has been wryly
commissioned the “SEC’s SPE (Special Purpose Entity)” because of its funding value.
See George Mundstock, The Trouble with FASB, 28 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 813, 834
(2003). “The SEC liked, and likes, having an off-budget source of financing for activities that it otherwise would be required to fund. FASB is the SEC’s SPE (Special
Purpose Entity).” Id.
179
Operating cash flow reflects net cash flow from a firm’s core business, sales in
the context of a merchandising concern, interest rate differentials and fee income in
the context of a depository institution, capital return in the context of a registered
broker-dealer, and the net return on underwriting in the context of an insurance
company.
See generally EUGENE BRIGHAM & MICHAEL EHRHARDT, FINANCIAL
MANAGEMENT THEORY AND PRACTICE 40–41 (10th ed. 2002). Operating cash flow tells
a reader of a firm’s financial statements how much liquidity arose or was consumed
by the firm’s core business. Id. In this sense, operating cash flow may be the best indicator of trends in a firm’s going concern value. Operating cash flow may be calculated with either the direct or indirect method, which presents operating activities in
different ways but leads to the same net cash flow from operations. See DYCKMAN ET
AL., supra note 108, at 1189. The indirect method derives the same net operating
cash flow amount by adjusting net income for items whose operating cash flow and
income effects are unequal. If the company chooses to report operations cash flow
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Of firms, only banks come close to disclosing their effective capital structure because they must report their OBS positions to their
182
banking supervisors. In these reports, the bank calculates its effective capital structure by converting OBS items into their balance sheet
equivalents. Many of these items are credit exposures to borrowers,
so conversion means that the bank adds these notional asset values to
183
its balance sheet, which must still balance even as adjusted.
Because prudential regulation imposes composition requirements on
bank capital, e.g., Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital requirements, bank regulators say that the bank faces a “capital charge” on the formally OBS
184
item. Banking supervisors demand that banks reveal their effective
under the direct method, the firm must also include a supplemental schedule showing the reconciliation of earnings and net operating cash flows, i.e., a schedule of the
indirect method. Id.
180
Investment cash flow reflects both the cash flow from a firm’s position-taking
in investment markets—just like any other investor in the capital market—as well as
the net cash effects of investing in (or liquidating) assets that support the firm’s core
business. DYCKMAN, supra note 108, at 1191–92. So, for example, investment cash
flow reflects the net return on a firm’s securities portfolio. Investment cash flow also
reflects allocations of cash to buy physical plant, depreciable equipment, franchises,
and other capital assets whose income is included in operating cash flow.
181
Financing cash flow reflects the firm’s cash position as a borrower and lender
in the capital market. Id. at 1192.
182
Since 1913, all state member banks of the Federal Reserve System must file
“call” reports of financial condition with their respective regulator. See Federal Reserve Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-43, 38 Stat. 251 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 12 U.S.C.); 12 U.S.C. § 632 (2000). The Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council coordinates the collection and dissemination of the call report,
which says much about banks’ OBS items. See Fed. Fin. Inst. Examination Council,
Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income for a Bank With Domestic and Foreign Offices, Schedule RC-L Derivatives and Off Balance Sheet Items (June 30,
2005), available at http://www.ffiec.gov/PDF/FFIEC_forms/FFIEC031_20050630_f.
pdf. Schedule RC-L distinguishes between OBS assets and OBS liabilities. Consider
the Comptroller of the Currency’s tough love advice to its banks on this point:
A gap report that does not include off-balance-sheet interest rate
positions does not fully measure a bank’s interest rate risk profile. All
material positions in off-balance-sheet instruments whose value can be
affected by interest rates should be captured in a gap report. Such instruments include interest rate contracts, such as swaps, futures, and
forwards; option contracts, such as caps, floors, and options on futures;
and firm forward commitments to buy or sell loans, securities, or other
financial instruments.
U.S. COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, INTEREST RATE RISK: COMPTROLLER’S HANDBOOK
78 (1997), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/handbook/irr.pdf.
183
The fundamental accounting equation still holds for this notional balance
sheet.
184
Extra prudent through asymmetry, prudential regulation does not generally
give regulatory capital credit, i.e., count an item as equity capital, for OBS commitments from a third party to contribute risk capital to a depository institution. Instead, banking regulators tend to give capital credit only for “a dollar on the barrel.”
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capital structure in regulatory reports because of the spillover risks
from bank failure and because federally-insured banking exposes the
185
Private firms do not directly
federal government to liquidity risk.
expose the federal government to such risk and, hence, are not sub186
ject to the same degree of transparency.
III. SLOUCHING TOWARDS TRANSPARENCY IN SARBANES-OXLEY
Faced with the transactional complexities discussed in Part II,
above, Congress turned away from a more detailed look at financial
reporting requirements and, instead, penalized individuals. Sarbanes-Oxley did, however, add some transparency about effective
capital structure, namely a direction to the SEC to require firms to
better disclose OBS arrangements. After noting the SEC’s reluctance
to engage seriously with accounting, this Part analyzes the new OBS
rule, which is a step in the right direction. It contributes to financial
187
literacy by legally classifying some types of OBS arrangements.
Nevertheless, the SEC—and I—conclude that more is needed.
A. Retreating to Accounting in Law
No statute explicitly charges the SEC with developing accounting standards. The New Deal’s Securities Act and the Exchange Act
188
gave the SEC authority over accounting standards.
These authoriInterview with Dr. Roger Tufts, Capital Department, Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, in Washington, D.C. (June 16, 2005) (on file with author).
185
Regulation protects bank solvency because of the federal government’s contingent exposure from insurance for customer deposits. Financially speaking, the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) bears residual loss when banks become insolvent. In this sense, the FDIC is short a put on the national portfolio of the
depositor institution, creating an appealing moral hazard for bank owners, who bear
only the residual upside in this lopsided deal. (A “put” is a legal obligation to buy an
asset for a fixed price. By ensuring depositor obligations, it is as though the FDIC
has promised to “buy” the assets of a failed bank in exchange for assuming its depositor obligations.) Given its short exposure, the federal government makes banks hike
up their skirts with respect to OBS items. For that reason, bank regulators require
banks to maintain enough capital to meet even OBS exposures.
186
The limited liability of corporations and other forms of business organization,
however, certainly produces social costs that are sometimes borne by the federal government.
187
As discussed in Part IV, standardizing information about the firm’s constituent
cash flows would help both investors and firms.
188
The Securities Act and the Exchange Act give the SEC parallel authority over
accounting. Securities Act of 1933 § 19, 15 U.S.C. § 77s (2000 & Supp. II 2002); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2000 & Supp. II 2002). The
SEC’s new OBS rule requiring disclosure of OBS arrangements which affect a registrant’s liquidity and capital resources is based in part on these essentially parallel
grants of authority. Although Congress passed these laws during a national panic,
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ties specifically extend to the form and use of the balance sheet.
Instead of using this authority directly, the SEC has let private standard setters make accounting pronouncements, often at the cost of
190
sound accounting principles.
This hands-off policy delayed adethat situation was not a moral panic—financial or otherwise—because the scope of
the New Deal’s state-building was proportional to a generalized and serious economic crisis. For a good general discussion of the early history of the SEC’s use of
accounting, see THE SEC AND ACCOUNTING: THE FIRST 50 YEARS (Robert H. Manheim
& Mayes E. Leech eds., 1984) (Not surprisingly, given my thesis, the twelve essays
make virtually no mention of the off-balance sheet sector or cash flow disclosures and
their utility as regulatory indicators.).
189
The Securities Act provides:
Among other things, the Commission shall have authority, for the purposes of this title . . ., to prescribe the form or forms in which required
information shall be set forth, the items or details to be shown in the
balance sheet and earning statement, and the methods to be followed
in the preparation of accounts, in the appraisal or valuation of assets
and liabilities, in the determination of depreciation and depletion, in
the differentiation of recurring and nonrecurring income, in the differentiation of investment and operating income, and in the preparation, where the Commission deems it necessary or desirable, of consolidated balance sheets or income accounts of any person directly or indirectly
controlling or controlled by the issuer, or any person under direct or
indirect common control with the issuer.
15 U.S.C. § 77s (2000 & Supp. II 2002) (emphasis added). The SEC’s authority under the Exchange Act is essentially identical except that the provision also grants authority to deconsolidate the balance sheet of a registrant: “The Commission may prescribe . . . the methods to be followed . . . in the preparation . . . of separate and/or
consolidated balance sheets or income accounts of any person directly or indirectly
controlling or controlled by the issuer, or any person under direct or indirect common control with the issuer . . . .” Id. § 78m(b)(1) (emphasis added).
190
See Mundstock, supra note 178, at 817 (“Accounting, like commercial law, developed before courts and legislatures became involved in business affairs. While
commercial law became an object for the state, accounting principles thus far have
not.” (footnotes omitted)). The endowment effect is one of the reasons for the
trend cited by Professor Mundstock:
Another factor that has contributed to the SEC’s ongoing abdication of responsibility over accounting principles is worth noting: People have a natural tendency to belittle expertise that they do not possess. The SEC has been composed primarily of lawyers. Lawyers do not
want to be bothered by accounting, which they view as merely “technical.” Hence, the SEC has been willing to leave accounting to the accountants.
Id. at 827. Professor Mundstock notes the importance of institutional self-interest in
standard setting:
To summarize the history of private standard-setting in America: the
players [including accountants] acted in their own self-interest . . . . Independence really has meant isolation and irrelevance. The central
feature of the resulting accounting standards is the flexibility notion:
accounts need not be right, merely acceptable. . . . When faced with
controversy, particularly critiques from business interests, the private
standard setter has either reorganized or capitulated. The SEC’s insti-
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quate regulation of OBS arrangements, which vexed fundamental ac191
counting assumptions. In fact, the FASB did not address how firms
192
ought to treat securitized assets—one type of OBS item—until 1996.
Although the early and continued focus of legislative attention after
Enron was on financier misconduct, former SEC Commissioner
Richard Breeden introduced the idea of requiring disclosure of
firms’ OBS arrangements into the public record on the very first day
193
of the Hearings. Some firms had voluntarily reported some of their
OBS arrangements after Enron’s problems had come to light, but by
194
then it was clear that more was needed in terms of regulation.
tutional interests—combined with the distaste for accounting shared by
most lawyers—have prevented the SEC from playing a proper role in
the setting of accounting principles.
Id. at 839.
191
See Donegan & Sunder, supra note 1, at 210:
Under our current system of financial reporting, articulation between stocks on the balance sheet and flows on the statements of income and changes in cash flow is both incomplete and imperfect; the
unavoidable lapses in articulation [i.e., mistakes and lack of correspondence between items on the balance sheet and flow statements] are
critical to understanding the OBSF [off-balance-sheet financing] problem. . . .
. . . How to construct correspondent variables, and under what conditions it is appropriate to abandon the task of articulation, are questions that lie at the heart of the major problems in standardizing accounting practice including OBSF.
Id. at 208. For example, market movements may change an OBS asset to a liability,
and then back again. Consider a swap. When in-the-money, it is an asset to the
swapholder. When out-of-the-money, it becomes a liability to the same counterparty.
See, e.g., U.S. COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, AN EXAMINER’S GUIDE TO INVESTMENT
PRODUCTS AND PRACTICES 90 (1992) (advising bank examiner to determine whether a
bank’s swap position increases or reduces risk).
192
FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING
STANDARDS NO. 125: ACCOUNTING FOR TRANSFER AND SERVICING OF FINANCIAL ASSETS
AND EXTINGUISHMENT OF LIABILITIES (1996). Implementation problems, though, led
to a substitute pronouncement. See FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 140: ACCOUNTING FOR TRANSFER AND SERVICING
OF FINANCIAL ASSETS AND EXTINGUISHMENT OF LIABILITIES (2000) (creates a safe harbor
for qualifying special purpose entities which need not be consolidated on a reporting
firm’s balance sheet). The direction of accounting pronouncements is towards keeping the balance sheet and selectively recognizing and disclosing certain OBS items.
See also FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING
STANDARDS NO. 133: ACCOUNTING FOR DERIVATIVE INVESTMENTS AND HEDGING
ACTIVITIES (1998), available at www.fasb.org/pdf/fas133.pdf.
193
See HEARINGS, supra note 55, at 62 (prepared statement of Richard C. Breeden,
Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 1989–1993).
194
See Fink, supra note 135 (describing how El Paso Corp. consolidated an OBS
subsidiary, how Electronic Data Systems began to voluntarily report its OBS debt in
its quarterly financial statements, and how PeopleSoft was considering book consolidation of a research and development subsidiary).

GABILONDO FINAL.DOC

2006]

3/6/2006 4:42:16 PM

FINANCIAL MORAL PANIC

831

Adopting Breeden’s suggestion, Congress directed the SEC to address the OBS sector by studying it and amending its rules to increase
195
the public disclosure of OBS arrangements. After rulemaking, the
SEC amended its forms and rules to require managers to discuss OBS
information in the management’s discussion and analysis of the an196
nual report. Under the new requirement, registrants must also file
a Form 8-K whenever they assume a direct financial obligation related
197
to an OBS item.
The OBS rule does not require recognition of OBS items on the
balance sheet, the income statement, or the statement of cash flows
in the sense of financially complete measurement and disclosure of
the item. Instead, the rule merely requires the firm to discuss the fact
198
of OBS items in sufficient detail.
As reflected in the Conference
199
Report, which introduced H.R. 3763 (later enacted into law as the
Act), Congress specifically expected the SEC to expand the disclosure
requirements for registrants’ OBS arrangements, but it is not clear
whether the current rule has done so. For example, the OBS rule requires firms to disclose OBS items only if they are “reasonably likely”
to impact the firm, a disclosure standard which gives reporting firms

195

See supra note 15 for the language of the new statutory reporting requirement.
See SEC Final Rule, supra note 16. These are changes to Regulations S-B and SK, which contain many of the SEC’s financial disclosure requirements for registrants.
See 17 C.F.R. § 228.303(c) (2005) (part of Regulation S-B); id. § 229.303(a)(4) (2005)
(part of Regulation S-K). A similar requirement was imposed on the Exchange Act
financial disclosures for foreign private issuers. Id. § 249.220(f) (2005) (foreign private issuers use Form 20-F to file an annual report with the SEC); id. § 249.240(f)
(2005) (qualified Canadian issuers use Form 40-F).
Publicly-registered companies must file public reports. Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 §§ 13, 15(d), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78o(d) (2000 & Supp. II 2002); see also 17
C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(4)(i) (2005).
198
For example, the information required by Item 301 to be included on the balance sheet, the statement of income, and the statement of cash flows are subject to
this standard of disclosure. 17 C.F.R. § 229.301 (2005). This information is “recognized” in the accounting sense that the impact of the information is reflected in the
firm’s reported financial position. In contrast, disclosure of the mere existence of an
item without further elaboration of its significance provides less information to readers of financial reports and leaves it to the discretion of corporate officials to decide
the materiality.
199
The Act:
requires the Commission to revise its regulations under the securities
laws to expand the disclosure requirements for the financial reports and
registration statements of public companies, so that they provide adequate and appropriate disclosure of certain of an issuer’s off-balance
sheet transactions.
H.R. REP. NO. 107-414, at 40 (2002) (emphasis added).
196
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200

broad leeway.
Originally, the SEC had proposed a disclosure
threshold lower (i.e., one that would lead to more disclosure) than
the standard generally used for material events, but the final rule
abandoned this approach, substituting a “reasonably likely” for a
201
“more than remote” standard. The “reasonably likely” threshold of
probability for disclosure defeats some of the purpose of the rule by
letting firms off the hook in terms of disclosing their effective capital
202
structure.
As well noted, the SEC’s adoption of a relatively weak
disclosure standard reflects successful rent-seeking by issuers, finance
firms, and accounting firms whose separate liquidity, business, and
203
liability-reduction interests converged in this rulemaking project.

200

See SEC Final Rule, supra note 16, codified at 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(4)(i)
(2005).
201
In a January 2002 statement, the SEC indicated that “reasonably likely” is a
lower disclosure threshold than “more likely than not.” See Commission Statement
About Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of
Operations, Exchange Act Release No. 33-8056, 67 FED. REG. 17 (Jan. 22, 2002),
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/33-8056.htm.
202
See Partnoy, supra note 18, at 1278 (arguing that even under the subsequent
OBS reporting requirements Enron managers need not have disclosed much of their
OBS activity if they concluded that the financial downside of this activity was more
remote than “reasonably likely”):
Disclosure of “reasonably likely” contingencies would not likely have
prevented the problems associated with Enron. Indeed, Enron arguably was in compliance with the newly-enacted SEC regulations. In assessing the firm’s financial contingencies at the end of 2000, management would not have considered a scenario in which Enron’s stock
price would decline by more than half to be “reasonably likely.” Accordingly, management would not have needed to disclose details
about Enron’s derivatives contracts with the SPEs. Nor would it have
been “reasonably likely” that the volatility of commodity prices in 2000
would continue.
203
Id. To the extent that a company’s true financial leverage exceeds its book leverage, a company’s funding costs would increase. So issuers interested in retaining
freedom to manage the balance sheet tactically defend managerial discretion over
OBS disclosures. Investment banks that collect transaction costs, i.e., fees, to plan
and implement complex OBS deals would defend their business line. The OBS rule
bears on the liability of accountants by setting out the scope of required disclosures,
so accountants have a mixed interest in the rule. A standard which unambiguously
establishes disclosure requirements immunizes accounting firms from pressure by
issuers interested in particular reporting treatments that may be inconsistent with the
standard. On the other hand, accountants have different levels of risk-aversion too,
and those with an appetite for more risk might prefer a rule with leeway to go out on
a limb in terms of whether and how OBS items are booked or disclosed. Most of the
comments from accounting firms noted the need for clarity. One of the advantages
for legal and financial scholarship of federal rulemaking under the Administrative
Procedure Act is that the comment process leaves a written record of rentseeking by
affected constituencies. These comments make it possible to document—and sometimes infer—the motives of affected constituencies.
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Notwithstanding the widespread criticisms of accounting rules
and auditors during the financial moral panic, the new rule turns directly to existing accounting standards and incorporates them by ref204
erence.
Specifically, the rule defines an OBS arrangement as one
of four items: a guarantee obligation captured by the definition in
205
FASB Interpretation No. 45; a retained or contingent interest in as206
sets transferred to an unconsolidated entity; an obligation referenced to the registrant’s stock which is excluded from FASB State207
ment of Financial Accounting Standards No. 133; or an obligation
in a variable interest entity as defined by FASB Interpretation No. 46
208
(FIN 46). In particular, by internalizing FIN 46, the OBS rule does
draw some relatively bright lines about the interests subject to con209
solidation.
However, the standard leaves open important legal
204

The regulatory definition uses the definitions established by three accounting
pronouncements: FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., FASB INTERPRETATION NO. 45:
GUARANTOR’S ACCOUNTING AND DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS FOR GUARANTEES,
INCLUDING INDIRECT GUARANTEES OF INDEBTEDNESS OF OTHERS (2002) (hereinafter
FIN 45), available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fin%2045.pdf; STATEMENT OF
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 133, supra note 192; FIN. ACCOUNTING
STANDARDS BD., FASB INTERPRETATION NO. 46: CONSOLIDATION OF VARIABLE INTEREST
ENTITIES (2003) (hereinafter FIN 46), available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fin%
2046.pdf. See Item 303(a)(4)(ii) of Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(4)(ii)
(2005). The definition is cross-referenced in several forms and rules. See, e.g., Form
8-K, Item 2.03, Instruction 1, available at http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form8k.pdf. The SEC had first proposed a rule discussing the new disclosure requirements. See SEC Proposed Rule: Disclosure in Management’s Discussion and Analysis
About Off-Balance Sheet Arrangements, Contractual Obligations and Contingent
Liabilities and Commitments, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 33-8144, 67 Fed.
Reg. 68054 (Nov. 4, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/338144.htm. In response to the proposed rule, most commenters asked the SEC to define OBS items more precisely. Disagreement about the type of financial arrangements this definition should capture were the most common remark made by persons and institutions who submitted comments during the proposed rule’s public
comment period.
205
17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(4)(ii)(A) (2005).
206
Id. at § 229.303(a)(4)(ii)(B).
207
Id. at § 229.303(a)(4)(ii)(C).
208
Id. at § 229.303(a)(4)(ii)(D).
209
For example, FIN 46 increases the minimum amount of third-party equity required in a special purpose entity to keep the entity off the sponsoring firm’s books
to ten percent from the previous floor of three percent. FIN 46, supra note 204, ¶ E23. Before this interpretation, a firm could avoid consolidating any SPE if at least
three percent of the equity was owned by separate investors. SPEs that had an effective external equity of less than three percent contributed to Enron’s downward liquidity spiral. FIN 46 also creates some safe harbors for entities and arrangements
that need not be consolidated. FIN 46 excludes the following legal forms from consolidation on a reporting firm’s balance sheet: qualifying special purpose entities as
defined by STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 140, supra note 192,
certain pension plans, not-for-profit entities, certain entities with interests in variable

GABILONDO FINAL.DOC

834

3/6/2006 4:42:16 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:781

questions because the Interpretation’s criteria go to the heart of the
210
meaning of an equity interest in a firm. As a result, the legal use of
this accounting standard also internalizes interpretive ambiguity, as
211
noted by the SEC.
These regulatory definitions of OBS arrangements, however, follow the pattern of the financial contracts involved in Enron. Essentially, it was these types of obligations which led to Enron’s liquidity
212
problems, raising the question of whether the rule leaves financial
213
reporting ready to fight the last war but not the next one.
Moreinterest entities created before December 31, 2003, entities meeting the definition of
a “business” under the standard, and certain other entities. FIN 46, supra note 204,
¶ 4.
210
The interpretation requires a firm to consolidate any firm that is a variable interest entity, which includes any entity in which the equity investor lacks one or more
of the following three incidents: 1) the direct or indirect ability to make decisions
that effect the success of the firm; 2) the obligation to absorb the entity’s expected
losses; or 3) the right to receive the entity’s residual gains. FIN 46, supra note 204,
¶ 14. As firms further unbundle risk, the question arises about the extent to which
the firm retains any residual risk or whether that residual risk has been farmed out to
other investors using OBS arrangements. For this reason, by turning FIN 46 into
positive law, the OBS rule sets the stage for judicial adjudications to determine equity
as an accounting matter. Those will be interesting cases to observe.
211
In its report to Congress, the SEC noted the ambiguity about this accounting
standard as used in the OBS rule. See SEC REPORT, supra note 17, at 92 (“Although
Interpretation No. 46(R) constitutes an improvement over the previously existing
consolidation guidance, a number of interpretive questions remain. Many users of
Interpretation No. 46R [sic] find it theoretically and practically challenging to apply.”). This is the converse situation to the FASB’s de facto role as disclosure monitor:
In principle, the jurisdiction of the FASB was said to be the setting of
financial accounting standards, whereas the jurisdiction of the SEC was
said to be disclosure. Yet the distinction has never been well-defined,
and, as a practical matter, the distinction is not operational. The standards of the FASB typically also include disclosure requirements.
BEAVER, supra note 5, at 12.
212
Enron guaranteed several investment contracts to investors who had provided
the nominal outside capital for the special purpose entities, e.g., Raptor, which Enron used to shift liabilities off the balance sheet. Obligations pegged to Enron common stock were one of the main triggers of the company’s downward liquidity spiral.
As Enron’s share price dropped, the company’s obligations to provide additional
consideration to investors holding these obligations increased, causing a liquidity
drain for the company. Many of the special purpose vehicles described in the Powers
report were variable interest entities. Relative to these three financial contracts, retained and contingent interests played a smaller role in Enron, although accounting
for retained interests has been a longstanding issue in connection with securitizations by banks.
213
Beaver notes as much:
Certainly, the accounting for Special Purpose Entities (SPEs) that was
at the heart of the problems with Enron’s financial reporting is being
revisited and rightly so. However, a revision in this accounting standard represents a specific fix for a problem involved in a specialized
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over, given the disclosure threshold adopted by the SEC, Enron
might not have even had to disclose these particular OBS arrange214
Nor would these new requirements have required discloments.
sure of the cash flow games that led to the highly publicized prosecu215
tion of officials at Adelphia Communications. In other words, what
is required to be disclosed is only a subset of the OBS arrangements
216
described previously.
Despite their under-inclusiveness, the attempt to codify the
meaning of OBS arrangements in the federal securities regime is a
good first step. This is no mean feat, because the OBS sector is where
217
the wild things are.
A brief summary of the major OBS arrangements is in order here. Many OBS arrangements are voluntary, i.e.,

type of transaction and does not in itself address broader issues. For
example, obtaining the effects of off-balance sheet financing via derivative
transactions is a much more pervasive and difficult problem to address.
Beaver, supra note 104, at 164 (emphasis added).
214
Professor Partnoy concurs:
Disclosure of “reasonably likely” contingencies would not likely have
prevented the problems associated with Enron. Indeed, Enron arguably was in compliance with the newly-enacted SEC regulations. In assessing the firm’s financial contingencies at the end of 2000, management would not have considered a scenario in which Enron’s stock
price would decline by more than half to be “reasonably likely.”
Partnoy, supra note 18, at 1278.
215
See Triantis, supra note 131, at 12.
216
See infra notes 217–24 and accompanying text for a partial taxonomy of OBS
arrangements.
217
Like the joke about the five blind men and the elephant, what is considered
off-balance-sheet depends on whom you ask:
Once upon a time, there were five blind men who had the opportunity to experience an elephant for the first time. The first approached
the elephant and, upon encountering one of its sturdy legs, stated,
“Ah, an elephant is like a tree.” The second, after exploring the trunk,
said, “No, an elephant is like a strong hose.” The third, grasping the
tail, said, “Fool! An elephant is like a rope!” The fourth, playing with
an ear, stated, “No, more like a fan.” And the fifth, leaning against the
animal’s side, said, “An elephant is like a wall.” The five then began to
argue loudly about who had the more accurate perception of the elephant.
The elephant, tiring of all this abuse, suddenly reared up and
stomped on all of the men. He continued to trample them until they
were nothing but bloody lumps of flesh. Walking away, the elephant
said, “It just goes to show that you can’t depend on first impressions.
When I first saw them I didn’t think they’d be any fun at all.”
Brad Templeton’s Rec.Humor.Funny, Leading the Blind, http://www.netfunny.
com/rhf/jokes/88q2/11950.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2006). What is the moral of
this story? Well, beware the all too real consequences of a market practice that you
have failed to describe properly.
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218

contractual, arrangements.
Banks have long made contingent
credit commitments to borrowers that may not be reflected on the
balance sheet, e.g., a depository institution’s letters of credit, finan219
cial guarantees, and other loan commitments. Firms use affiliated
trusts, limited liability partnerships, and limited liability companies to
220
avoid recognizing financial activity on the balance sheet. Firms ac221
tive in real estate may keep leases and synthetic leases off the balance sheet to reduce the reported firm size and its effective leverage.
Sometimes a contract substitutes for a special purpose vehicle; for example, “take-or-pay” and “throughput” contracts require periodic
payments for goods or services without regard to whether the buyer
222
takes delivery or actually uses the services. Another OBS entity, the
special purpose entity (SPE), is a separate legal person designed to
serve a single purpose, for example, to hold assets or liquefy receiv223
ables.
Other OBS liabilities include forward and futures contracts
218

The broadest construction of the phrase would capture executory contracts,
employment agreements, licenses, royalty contracts, pension commitments, and
guarantees to customers under contracts. See SEC Final Rule, supra note 16. The
SEC narrowed the reach of the rule by limiting OBS items to those determined as
such under certain accounting statements. Id. But this produces regulatory renvoi:
the legal scope of these pronouncements has yet to be determined. See supra notes
209–11 and accompanying text.
219
See CHRIS J. BARLTROP & DIANA MCNAUGHTON, 2 BANKING INSTITUTIONS IN
DEVELOPING MARKETS: INTERPRETING FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 13 (World Bank 1992)
(classifying banks’ OBS exposures, including credit substitutes and contingent liabilities). Assets and asset expectancies may be OBS too. The same contingent credit
commitments of the depository institutions described above become assets of the
lender once the borrower has drawn down on the credit line. As a credit intermediary, the function of a bank is to trade in products which reflect the holding preferences of other market participants with respect to the term and liquidity characteristics of assets and liabilities. One example of such a product is the bank’s
commitment to extend credit to a (contingent) borrower in the event that this borrower fails to make payment on another contractual obligation. If the contingency
ripens and the borrower draws down on the credit line, this credit exposure of the
bank shows up as an asset on its balance sheet. In this sense, asset expectancies may
also be OBS.
220
See Mei Feng, Jeffrey D. Gramlich & Sanjay Gupta, Special Purpose Entities: Empirical Evidence on Determinants and Earnings Management (Jan. 9, 2006), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=717301.
221
The best of both worlds, a synthetic lease lets the lessor depreciate the asset as
though she owned it without recognizing the debt that true ownership would have
entailed. See John Murray, Off-Balance-Sheet Financing: Synthetic Real Estate, 24 MICH.
REAL PROP. REV. 5 (1997).
222
See generally Soroosh & Ciesielski, supra note 122.
223
SPEs are perhaps the OBS arrangement which has generated the most public
and regulatory interest as of late due to Enron. Enron made wide use of special purpose entities (SPEs). It would transfer assets to the SPE, immediately recognize a financial accounting gain on the transfer as though sold at arm’s-length, defer the
recognition of any losses on the transferred assets, and reduce its book leverage by
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lawsuits and other kinds of liabilities in the form of derivatives, e.g.,
224
credit derivatives. Even this partial taxonomy suggests the breadth
of the OBS sector.
B. Persistent Opacity in the Off-Balance-Sheet Sector
The Act also required the SEC to report on the efficacy of its
225
rulemaking to increase the transparency of OBS arrangements.
Separately, the Act also directed the SEC to report on the existing
226
(In a sense, the market
market structure of OBS arrangements.
structure report was intended to serve as a demonstration of the efficacy of the new reporting requirements.) The SEC filed a single re227
port to Congress addressing both issues.
Despite noting modest
improvements in transparency, the report concluded that inadequate
228
disclosure of OBS arrangements persisted.
For example, the SEC
concluded that financial transparency problems exist with regard to
229
the reporting of firms’ investments in other entities, of contingent
shifting debt in respect to the assets off of the firm balance sheet. This worked well
until the value of Enron stock fell, triggering contractual commitments that taxed
the firm’s liquidity.
224
A forward contract is a present contractual duty to perform at some future
date. See INTEREST RATE RISK: COMPTROLLER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 182, at 96–98. A
futures contract is a forward contract that trades on a federally registered commodities exchange market. Id. at 93–95. A credit derivative is a contract that obligates a
counterparty to indemnify a lender in the event of a credit loss on a loan to a third
party borrower. See generally OCC Bulletin, U.S. Comptroller of the Currency, OCC
96-43: Credit Derivatives (Aug. 12, 1996).
225
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 401(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 7261(c)(1) (Supp. II
2002).
226
Id. § 401(c)(2)(E), 15 U.S.C. § 7261(c)(2)(E) (Supp. II 2002).
227
See SEC REPORT, supra note 17, at 91–98.
228
The difficulty that I had locating anecdotal and aggregate information about
the OBS sector for this Article leads me to join the following SEC conclusion about
the ongoing underinclusiveness of adequate financial information about the OBS
sector:
Nevertheless, it appears that issuers may not have identified all of
the off-balance sheet arrangements that are required to be discussed in
the OBS section of MD&A. Further, the Staff believes—based in part
on the difficulties faced in gathering the data necessary for the Study
and Report—that the quality of the issuer disclosures provided in the
off-balance sheet section of MD&A can and should be improved.
Id. at 98.
229
The Staff notes that, due to the varying placement of the disclosures and
the different levels of disclosures required [for investments], it may
sometimes be difficult for investors to fully comprehend the extent of
an issuer’s involvement with equity method investments and to compare
such involvements across issuers. As a result, the Staff acknowledges
that the values reported . . . may be understated.
Id. at 40.
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231

obligations and guarantees, of derivatives, and with respect to
232
firms’ OBS arrangements generally. These conclusions may understate the scope of the problem because the sample that provided the
filings for the study does not represent the universe of most active us233
ers of OBS arrangements. The ongoing opacity of the OBS sector
may also be due to the SEC’s decision not to require firms to disclose
comprehensive information about the unconsolidated entities with
234
which a firm had OBS transactions. Because more is needed in the
230

“The Staff noted during its analysis of the filings that disclosures about contingent obligations vary widely in terms of format and location in the filing. As a result,
the data for contingent obligations was difficult to collect in a consistent manner
across issuers.” Id. at 69.
231
Despite the disclosures required by the accounting standards and the
Commission’s rules, there is still often a perceived lack of transparency
as to an issuer’s market risk exposures, use of derivatives and the potential impact of those derivatives. . . .
....
. . . [A]s a result of conducting the Study of filings by issuers, the
Staff notes that it is often difficult to determine the total dollar
amounts that are on the balance sheet related to derivatives. This difficulty stems from the fact that derivatives may be presented as separate
line items on the balance sheet, or alternatively, included as a component of some broader category (e.g., other assets).
Id. at 80–81.
232
“In many cases, it is obvious whether the commitment in question is, indeed,
on the issuer’s balance sheet (e.g., debt). However, in some cases, the Staff notes
that whether the item is on or off the balance sheet remains unclear.” Id. at 90.
233
See SEC REPORT, supra note 17, at 27–29. The study sample was based on the
100 issuers with the largest capitalization and 100 randomly selected issuers. Id. The
sample selection methodology used by the SEC did not target the actual users of OBS
arrangements. The pattern is that firms with greater financial risk tend to use OBS
arrangements more than firms with less leverage. The managerial reasons for optimizing the balance sheet discussed earlier explain why this is so. Had the SEC been
sensitive to effective capital structure, the sample might have been targeted more
carefully to identify the firms with the greatest tendency to use OBS arrangements,
i.e., highly indebted firms interested in reducing the appearance of leverage. Consequently, a sampling methodology that better targeted active users of OBS arrangements would probably have revealed an even greater degree of opacity in financial reporting.
234
The SEC’s proposed rule had required disclosure of assets and liabilities of unconsolidated entities with which a firm had OBS arrangements. SEC Proposed Rule,
supra note 204. In the Final Rule, however, the SEC receded from this requirement:
We have eliminated one aspect of the proposed disclosure requirements after considering the public commentary. The amendments do
not require a registrant to disclose the nature and amount of the total
assets and total obligations of an unconsolidated entity that conducts
off-balance sheet activities on behalf of the registrant. Commenters
indicated that it might be impracticable to obtain, monitor or evaluate
information about unconsolidated entities that are unaffiliated with
the registrant.
See SEC Final Rule, supra note 16.
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way of material financial disclosures, Part IV of this Article recommends disclosures to further implement the disclosure objectives of
the Act.
It is too early to comprehensively map the ultimate impact of the
OBS rule, but changes have already occurred. While disclosing information about these arrangements may reduce the cost of capital
235
for some securities issuers, capital costs have, in fact, increased for
some firms after their disclosure of the existence of OBS arrange236
ments.
If the past is prologue, firms will certainly minimize the
compliance costs of the new rule by restructuring their transactions
to avoid disclosures which adversely impact their capital and liquidity
activities, leading to a fresh round of financial legerdemain and regu237
latory reprisal. Overall, firms will likely reduce their OBS activities,
especially to avoid the stigma of reporting previously undisclosed li235

Cf. Douglas Diamond & Robert Verrecchia, Disclosure, Liquidity, and the Cost of
Capital, 46 J. FIN. 1325, 1328–32 (1991) (making a mathematical argument that for
large firms disclosure of financial information may add value by reducing the potential information asymmetry with investors, who might otherwise refrain from holding
the securities of those firms).
236
See, e.g., Andrew Osterland, Reining In SPEs: New Rules for Special-Purpose Entities
May Result in Bigger Corporate Balance Sheets, CFO.COM, May 1, 2002, http://www.cfo.
com/printable/article.cfm/3004484?f=options (describing credit downgrade and
fifty percent price drop of share price of Adelphia Communications Corp. after it
disclosed OBS debt in previously unconsolidated special-purpose entities).
237
The SEC noted that some companies had already done so:
In anticipation of the implementation of Interpretation No. 46 and
Interpretation No. 46(R), a number of entities restructured arrangements with potential VIEs [variable interest entities] such that they
would not require consolidation. Disclosures of such restructurings
were noted in the [SEC report] sample companies. The Staff also is
aware anecdotally that many arrangements with potential VIEs were restructured such that the entity either would not be considered a VIE or
such that no party would be required to consolidate the VIE.
See SEC REPORT, supra note 17, at 92.
This is another example of the “dance between the regulator and the regulated.” Pouncy, supra note 2, at 546. Compliance by restructuring transactions or
entities is common with respect to accounting standards. For example, FASB passed
STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 13 [hereinafter SFAS No. 13],
supra note 121, to increase the reporting of OBS operating leases. SFAS No. 13 required firms to include a lease on the balance sheet if the lease possesses any of the
following four attributes: the lease transfers ownership of the leased asset to the lessee; the lease lets the lessee purchase the leased asset for a below-market price; the
lease is not cancelable for 75% or more of the lease’s economic life; or the present
value of the minimum lease payments on the lease are at least 90% of the leased asset’s value. Id. Evidence suggests that firms restructured the terms of their capital
leases to avoid triggering SFAS No. 13’s capitalization requirements. See Eugene A.
Imhoff, Jr. & Jacob K. Thomas, Economic Consequences of Accounting Standards: The
Lease Disclosure Rule Change, 10 J. ACCT. & ECON. 277 (1988) (showing how firms
modified capital leases to avoid the new disclosure requirement).
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238

abilities. Some firms are considering the joint venture as an alter239
Without the cost-savings fornative to other OBS arrangements.
merly available through OBS arrangements, firms may pass on in240
creased credit costs to their customers.
This new regulatory change and the ensuing OBS market structure shift may also impact the internal management structure of the
241
firm. For example, consider the emergence of the CFO function as
a reaction to the increased tactical significance of a firm’s funding activities. Today, the CFO provides strategic decision support for other
managers rather than merely overseeing what were formerly the
242
more ministerial functions of the treasurer and comptroller.
238

As noted by accounting researchers:
This new interpretation might cause very few changes in corporate balance sheets, because companies that would have to consolidate their
SPEs under the requirements of this interpretation might already be
taking steps to shut down or sell their interests prior to the effective
date. This scenario would avoid the embarrassment for the sponsors of
presenting what they never professed to own. The other alternative is
that Interpretation 46(R) might cause significant adverse adjustments
to companies’ balance sheets and create technical defaults in loan
covenants.
Soroosh & Ciesielski, supra note 122, at 37.
239
See, e.g., Marie Leone, Off-Balance-Sheet Deals: C’est la Vie?, CFO.COM, Jan. 1,
2003, http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/3007774?f=related (discussing how some
corporations look to joint ventures to substitute for investments in securitizations,
synthetic leases, and unconsolidated entities which must now be disclosed under the
OBS rule).
240
Some banks act as conduit sponsors on behalf of clients. By requiring the
sponsor banks to consolidate some previously OBS debt onto the balance sheet,
banks face regulatory capital charges. The incidence of this cost does not stay with
the bank, however. As one bank manager commented, “If we cannot maintain
[these loans] off balance sheet, at a minimum our clients’ costs will go up . . . . Worst
case, we cut their line.” Brett Nelson, A Blue Summer For Off-Balance-Sheet Lenders?,
FORBES.COM, Apr. 11, 2003, http://www.forbes.com/2003/04/11/cz_bn_0411banks.
html (quoting Bradley Schwartz, managing director of asset-backed conduits at J.P.
Morgan Chase, which administers $17 billion in conduits).
241
Patterns of leverage influence how a firm organizes its financial management.
For example, firms with high leverage appoint a Chief Risk Officer to manage risk
enterprise-wide. See André P. Liebenberg & Robert E. Hoyt, The Determinants of Enterprise Risk Management: Evidence from the Appointment of Chief Risk Officers, 6 RISK
MGMT. & INS. REV. 37, 45 (2003).
242
Typically an accountant, the comptroller acts with actual authority, has some
general knowledge of the firm’s overall financial position, and reports to an officer.
Generally a corporate treasurer maintains custody of accounts, manages relationships with creditors, services debt, and coordinates investment. See JAMES D. WILLSON
ET AL., CONTROLLERSHIP: THE WORK OF THE MANAGERIAL ACCOUNTANT 19–20 (6th ed.
1999) (discussing relationship between treasurer, controller, and chief financial officer). The comptroller forecasts the raising and utilization of liquidity, reconciles
bank account balances, and manages internal control systems with respect to receipts
and disbursements. Id. at 604–11 A small firm may not separate the treasurer and
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Unlike the comptroller, a CFO may have significant apparent authority to bind the firm in complex financing transactions. Poised as a
convenient folk devil, when a scandal occurs, the CFO is often the
first officer to be blamed, fired, and, at times, prosecuted for violations of federal securities laws. The Act’s attestation requirements
contribute to this tendency by increasing both the CFO’s significance
243
and liability.
Despite the congressional mandate, additional funding, the
agency’s extensive research on the issue, and intense public pressure,
the SEC could not definitively estimate the size of the OBS sector. If
the SEC could not get this information, how could an investor make
an informed investment decision about these firms? The purpose of
the financial transparency ratio suggested in Part IV is to relate potentially material, undisclosed management accounting data about
OBS arrangements to the balance sheet for the benefit of the wider
244
investing public.
IV. CONFORMING FINANCIAL REPORTING LAW TO FUNDING VÉRITÉ
Given the ongoing opacities in the OBS market discussed above,
more is needed. I recommend that the SEC take two regulatory actions to satisfy its duties under the Act to increase financial disclo-

the controller function. Id. Many firms have brought the comptroller under a Chief
Financial Officer (CFO) to respond to the growing market and legal demands of
funding. Christine H. Andersen, The CFO Transformation: From Chief Accountant to
Change Agent, AME INFO, May 23, 2005, http://www.ameinfo.com/60697.html (emphasizing the role of the current CFO as an enterprise-wide risk manager); BOOZ
ALLEN HAMILTON, CFO THOUGHT LEADERS: ADVANCING THE FRONTIERS OF FINANCE 9–
10 (2005) (cross-industry study of the CFO function at global firms concluding that
increasingly, CFOs act as change agents rather than accountants). The CFO’s functions include both overseeing the firm capital structure and the preparation of its
internal and external financial reports. In addition to these functions, a CFO typically also oversees asset investment, accounting, risk management, dividend policy,
incentive design, tax policy, and cost aspects of compensation policy. See Thomas
Copeland, The Expanding Role of the CFO, WEEKLY TOYO KEIZAI (Japan), Sept. 1, 2001,
available at http:// ssrn.com/abstract =717703. Increasingly, the CFO engages more
substantively in decision-support at the executive level than previously and less in
controlling and reporting transactions. See GATES, supra note 166, at 26 (conducting
interviews and surveys of chief financial officers regarding composition of the CFO
function). Anecdotal evidence suggests that a growing number of chief executive
officers served previously as CFOs. See Copeland, supra.
243
See supra note 98 for attestation requirements.
244
See supra notes 248–56 and accompanying text (for a ratio that would tell investors about the magnitude of management accounting data that is not disclosed in
financial accounting reports).
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245

sures.
First, the SEC should make registrants include a financial
transparency ratio on their balance sheet that lets readers know the
magnitude of what is not otherwise being disclosed about OBS items.
This transparency ratio would act as an interface between the managerial accounting information (available only to firm insiders) and
the financial accounting information required to be released by federal securities law as such. The transparency ratio would alert investors to risks the current information asymmetry makes difficult to
246
evaluate. Second, the SEC should exercise its statutory authorities
over accounting to make the statement of cash flows more useful as a
public financial report by introducing some categories, including a
distinction between operating cash flow and other types. Finally, a
bureaucratic reform is in order too. The SEC should make policy research about trends in effective capital structure a routine part of its
job, rather than a dramatic interruption of the agency’s perceived
core functions. That way, the SEC could proactively deal with future
funding shifts and their financial reporting implications and, thereby,
247
stem future financial moral panics with facts instead of speculation.
Being more aggressively self-informed about funding practices would
reduce the SEC’s risk of reputational slight through congressional
prodding after celebrated disasters.
A. Reducing the Public Information Gap with a Financial
Transparency Ratio
Being able to determine the inclusiveness of a firm’s reported
financial position is presumptively material. Firms must now disclose
any OBS arrangements material to a firm’s liquidity or capital re248
249
sources.
To link the GAAP balance sheet to a firm’s effective
245

These recommendations further the SEC’s policy initiatives set out in its study
of OBS arrangements. See SEC REPORT, supra note 17, at 98–105. In particular, disclosures of a balance sheet to OBS ratio and funding dynamics that are presumptively material (i.e., the two specific recommendations in this Part of the Article)
would further consistency of financial disclosures, one of the four major initiatives
discussed in this section of the Report.
246
Although the substance of the information would not be internalized into the
decision-making process of a market participant, the investors would be aware of the
fact of the information.
247
Making recommendations that are capable of being implemented is part of the
institutional microanalytic approach in law. “[T]he microanalysis of existing institutions is more practical, at least in the short run, and more amenable to the specifically legal approach of framing recommendations to existing policymakers.” Rubin,
supra note 90, at 1431 (arguing that institutional microanalysis can synthesize the historically separate critical disciplines such as alterity jurisprudence and law and economics).
248
See SEC Final Rule, supra note 16.
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capital structure, the SEC should require registrants to put a financial
transparency ratio on the balance sheet. The ratio would add marginal value with respect to undisclosed items or to the materiality of a
250
firm’s OBS portfolio in the aggregate. Inspired by the leverage ratios used in financial analysis, a transparency ratio would reflect the
proportion of, on the one hand, information required to be disclosed
under current disclosure standards to, on the other hand, undisclosed information about contingencies known to the firm through
its managerial accounting but not required to be revealed under cur251
rent regulatory reporting thresholds.
In so doing, the ratio would
lessen information gaps between well-informed firm insiders, moderately-informed institutional investors, and uninformed public shareholders by signaling how much management accounting data escapes
disclosure in public reports prepared using financial accounting
252
rules. This proposal avoids the risk of excess disclosure for complex
253
transactions which has been persuasively noted.
Such a ratio promotes transparency without risking disclosure
logorrhea of irrelevant data or requiring firms to disclose sensitive in254
formation about specific financial claims. To the extent that the ra249

See supra note 10.
In other words, the ratio would reflect the dollar volume of OBS arrangements, which taken singly would not rise to the level of materiality that currently
triggers disclosure under the OBS rule. A firm may have several OBS positions, no
single one of which materially impacts the firm’s liquidity or capital. Yet when added
together the sum of OBS positions becomes material. The ratio would reveal the potential scope of such a risk.
251
Finance ratios use financial statement data to understand and predict firm performance. See William Beaver, Financial Ratios as Predictors of Failure, in EMPIRICAL
RESEARCH IN ACCOUNTING: SELECTED STUDIES, 1966, at 71–111 (Sidney Davidson ed.,
1967). See also KALLBERG & PARKINSON, supra note 3, at 23–31 (summarizing types of
financial ratios used to evaluate a firm’s liquidity). Financial leverage measures the
amount of debt to equity in a firm’s capital structure. Operating leverage attempts to
assess the degree to which a firm’s operating costs are fixed. Meaningfully estimating
operating leverage is difficult. Id. at 75. A firm may calculate its leverage ratios for
internal use differently from leverage ratios intended for public dissemination.
252
See supra notes 130–34 and accompanying text (regarding information asymmetries).
253
See Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm in a World of Complexity,
2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 18–19 (2004) (challenging the sufficiency of disclosure of
complex deals because the disclosure will not yield enough investors who understand
the transaction in time to impact market prices). He calls these “disclosure-impaired
transactions.” Id. at 30.
254
The SEC justified its adoption of the “reasonably likely” threshold for disclosure in part on the fear that a lower standard would generate too much information:
“We believe that the ‘reasonably likely’ threshold best promotes the utility of the disclosure requirement by reducing the possibility that investors will be overwhelmed by
voluminous disclosure of insignificant and possibly unnecessary speculative informa250
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tio draws attention to undisclosed information, this proposal might
reduce trading liquidity in a firm’s securities. At its simplest, the ratio
would compare the size of the reported balance sheet to a pro forma
balance sheet—based on confidential management accounting information—that reflected a financial rather than accounting definition of leverage. In other words, the numerator of the ratio would be
the GAAP balance sheet and the denominator would be an effective
255
balance sheet. To calculate such a ratio would require auditors to
systematically review confidential management accounting data and
to put it in the context of publicly available information. A ratio of
1:1 would signal perfect transparency. The lower the ratio, e.g., 1:2,
the less the amount of financial transparency in the firm’s public financial reports. A low financial transparency ratio might signal du256
bious financial reporting motives.
(For example, a firm may want
to hide a higher leverage ratio or a concentration of debt contracts
coming due for renegotiation.) By reminding the reader of financial
statements of the limits of the balance sheet, the ratio would provide
fair notice that an investor may need to poke around in a firm’s financial reports. Changes in the ratio would also alert a reader as to
whether a firm was changing its fundamental strategy with respect to
the transparency of its funding practices.
B. Using Cash Flow Reporting to Further Disaggregate the Firm
Adding some reporting granularity to the statement of cash flows
would help investors and other market intermediaries to evaluate a
firm’s funding position by reducing the transaction costs of monitor257
ing the firm’s cash flows. Doing this would further the SEC’s stated

tion.” See SEC Final Rule, supra note 16, at 7. In that same vein, a prominent scholar
of securitizations and their disclosure implications believes that disclosure of enough
information to understand certain OBS deals would overwhelm readers of financial
reports. See Schwarcz, supra note 253, at18–19 (challenging the sufficiency of disclosure of complex deals because the disclosure will not yield enough investors who understand the transaction in time to impact market prices). He calls these “disclosureimpaired transactions.” Id. at 30.
255
The denominator could include the four arrangements listed in the OBS rule.
Managers would still use their own judgment when deciding whether an item met
the materiality threshold for disclosure, but the practice of calculating the ratio
would complement the OBS rule.
256
See supra note 118 and accompanying text. Research also notes that financial
transparency may be correlated with creditworthiness. For example, more creditworthy firms are willing to disclose debt on the balance sheet, while firms interested in
managing their credit rating more carefully may prefer OBS financing.
257
See BEAVER, supra note 5, at 6 (noting that the value of accounting disclosures
depends on the processing costs of the data to the user).
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policy of encouraging disclosure of material information about fund258
ing.
The statement of cash flows distinguishes between investment,
259
operational, and financing cash flows. However, the statement currently blurs two streams of investment cash flow that would have
more informational value if unbundled: (1) that from investment in
assets related to a firm’s core functions; and (2) that due to investments in other than operational assets. By separating operational investment cash flow from market investment cash flow the classification
would let the reader distinguish between investment required by the
firm’s core activities and that from the firm’s activities as a speculative
investor in the market. Such a distinction would help an investor to
appreciate whether cash flow is attributable to business decisions
about operations or to speculative investment decisions.
Since the statement of cash flows reflects the impact of much
260
OBS activity, comparing the volume of cash flow overall to a firm’s
risk capital in the form of a ratio would reflect the effective ability of a
firm to leverage risk capital into liquidity. Abnormally high cash flow
leverage ratios—or unusual trends in a firm’s cash flow leverage ra261
tio—could signal risk from OBS activities.

258

In response to a petition from several accounting firms, the SEC had—before
the OBS rulemaking—issued a statement calling for improvement of the quality of
disclosure of OBS arrangements and clarifying the scope of registrants’ then-duties
under Regulation S-K, Item 303. Commission Statement about Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations, Release Nos.
33-8056, 34-45321 (Jan. 22, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/338056.htm. This guidance emphasized the cause and effect relationship between OBS
activity and a firm’s solvency and liquidity:
[R]egistrants should consider describing the sources of short-term
funding and the circumstances that are reasonably likely to affect those
sources of liquidity. . . .
....
If the registrant’s liquidity is dependent on the use of off-balance
sheet financing arrangements, such as securitization of receivables or
obtaining access to assets through special purpose entities, the registrant should consider disclosure of the factors that are reasonably likely
to affect its ability to continue using those off-balance sheet financing
arrangements.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
259
For a discussion of the statement of cash flows, see SEC REPORT, supra note 17,
at 11–14.
260
See supra note 170–71, 179–81 and accompanying text.
261
So, for example, Enron’s cash flow games described in Part II.B might have
been reflected through such ratio analysis.
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C. Exploiting the SEC’s Comparative Advantage to Conduct Capital
Structure Market Surveillance
The financial moral panic revealed technical gaps in the SEC’s
capital structure knowledge, an agency whose institutional structure
262
emphasizes disclosure and enforcement. This enforcement emphasis means that the contours of current law determine the agency’s ef263
A more institutionally pervasive focus on
fective knowledge base.
capital market structure would complement the SEC’s current ap264
proaches. The General Accounting Office recently noted these limits:
Both SEC and industry officials agree that the current level of
human capital and budgetary resources has strained SEC’s capacity to address current and evolving market issues. Industry officials generally hold SEC staff in high regard and said that SEC
does a good job overall. However, industry officials also said that
they would like to see SEC devote more effort to evolving and on265
going areas . . . .

Although the agency has conducted special industry studies to
cover self-diagnosed technical gaps, it failed to do so in time to deal
266
with the crises in the OBS sector. Accordingly, the Act directs the
262

For example, the focus of the Division of Enforcement—a historically and increasingly prominent function at the SEC—requires market knowledge only as
needed to supplement legal claims in an enforcement action. In contrast, the few
units that interact with firms regularly know the most about market structure.
263
Some exceptions are worth noting. The Office of Risk Management (Division
of Market Regulation) monitors compliance by registered broker-dealers with the
liquidity requirements of the net capital rule for broker-dealers. This Office has rich
firm-level knowledge that could usefully be synthesized into a better understanding
of broker-dealer market structure. See generally Michael P. Jamroz, The Net Capital
Rule, 47 BUS. LAW. 863 (1992) (describing in significant detail how the net capital
rule ensures the liquidity of broker-dealers). When I worked in the Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations (OCIE), I was enriched by regular and comprehensive contact with broker-dealers, securities exchanges, clearing and depository
entities, and other financial intermediaries. See generally John H. Walsh, Right the First
Time: Regulation, Quality, and Preventive Compliance in the Securities Industry, 1997
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 165, 177–78 (1997) (describing OCIE’s statutory authorities and
programs).
264
Respectful of the agency staff’s commitment to capital markets, I make these
recommendations in the spirit of preserving the agency’s reputation as a jewel of the
New Deal.
265
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SEC OPERATIONS: INCREASED WORKLOAD CREATES
CHALLENGES, GAO-02-302, at 24 (2002) (finding that securities market structure
changes had dramatically increased the volume and complexity of the SEC’s workload and recommending increased capacity for the agency). See also HEARINGS, supra
note 55, at 620.
266
See, e.g., SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, THE OCTOBER 1987 MARKET BREAK (1988) (analyzing the causes of market volatility that led to a thirty percent loss in the value of
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SEC to increase its technical expertise not just with respect to OBS
267
arrangements but also securities violators and violations, enforce268
269
ment actions, and credit rating agencies, suggesting the need for
270
the SEC to retool its market structure knowledge generally.
The
Act’s directions to the General Accounting Office to conduct capital
market studies more typically in the SEC’s bailiwick raise questions of
whether the SEC has already lost some reputational capital with Con271
gress.
Congress has enabled the agency to update its institutional mission by increasing its appropriation and reducing the transaction
costs of hiring technical experts. First, Congress gave the SEC pay
parity with depository institution regulators, who have long been able
272
to pay staff more than the salaries on the General Service scheduler.
traded common stocks); SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY & BD. OF
GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., JOINT REPORT ON THE GOVERNMENT SECURITIES
MARKET (1992) (examining government securities market structure and considering
regulatory approaches after a bidding regularity in the government securities auction); Report of Investigation Pursuant Regarding the Nasdaq Stock Market, Inc., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 51163 (Feb. 9, 2005), available at http://www.sec.
gov/litigation/investreport/34-51163.htm (investigating market maker practices in
the over-the-counter market). The pattern is that crises trigger self-directed studies
of a particular market problem.
267
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 703, 15 U.S.C. § 7201 note (GAO Study and Report Regarding Consolidation of Public Accounting Firms) (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
268
Id. § 704.
269
Id. § 702.
270
Congress’s direction to the SEC to conduct these studies suggests a critique of
how the agency has handled the make-buy problem as applied to certain knowledge
about capital market structure. The make-buy problem takes a different form in the
context of a federal agency. Statutes determine the agency’s freedom to determine
what goes on and what stays out, i.e., its institutional structure.
271
Sarbanes-Oxley requires the Comptroller General to study the impact of requiring mandatory rotation of registered accounting firms (Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 § 207), the impact of the consolidation of accounting firms on public audit
quality (Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 701) and the relationship of investment banks
and their advisors earnings management by private firms (Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 § 705). Tasking the GAO with studies that fit squarely within the SEC’s jurisdiction may reflect a desire not to burden the SEC with more studies. But one wonders
whether Congress doubted whether the SEC had enough internal knowledge, capital
and willingness to address these questions, which bear importantly on market structure, or whether the GAO studies reflect a desire to have independent analysis with
which to critically evaluate the performance of the SEC.
272
Previously, Congress had exempted the Federal Reserve Board, the Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency, the Office of Thrift Supervision, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the National Credit Union Administration from
statutory ceilings on staff compensations. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery
and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, §§ 805, 1105, 1202, 1203, 1206,
103 Stat. 183 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 & 15 U.S.C.). In response to vigorous SEC advocacy, Congress extended the same pay parity privileges
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More recently, Congress increased the SEC’s flexibility in hiring ac273
countants, economists, and securities analysts. Increased resources
without a more comprehensive market structure approach to capital
structure surveillance will not, however, solve the regulatory report274
ing problems highlighted by these scandals. Therefore, to deal with
this problem the SEC should establish a research and analysis unit
(or reconfigure existing institutional resources) to exploit the SEC’s
existing knowledge base and to add to it by closely following trends in
275
effective capital structure. This the SEC can do with the approval of
276
a majority of commissioners before Congress acts remedially again.
Such a unit could best exploit the agency’s informational advantage
277
278
about how firms finance themselves. The SEC’s § 401(c) report is

to the SEC. Investor and Capital Markets Fee Relief Act, Pub. L. NO. 107-123, §8, 115
Stat. 2390 (2002).
273
Accountant, Compliance, and Enforcement Staffing Act of 2003, Pub. L. No.
108-44, 117 Stat. 842. The law allows the SEC to appoint these staff to the excepted
service rather than the competitive service, which restricts employer discretion to redeploy or discharge staff more than the excepted service.
274
A small number of economists in the Office of Economic Analysis participate
in a wide variety of regulatory, surveillance, and enforcement functions. This office
needs more financial economists specifically trained in monitoring trends in firms’
effective capital structure.
275
Drawing again on bank regulation, I urge the SEC to disrupt the Weberian
logic of its current departmental structure and to consider the usefulness of an interdivisional approach to capital structure surveillance. The Capital Steering Committee (Capital Steering) of the Comptroller of the Currency (Comptroller) is an example of an inter-divisional process that targets OBS items. Like any complex government bureaucracy, the Comptroller is functionally divided into a legal division,
banking supervision divisions, a special unit that looks at regulatory capital policy,
international divisions, and risk management divisions. Recognizing that OBS funding crosses these organizational units, the Comptroller has a standing inter-divisional
process in Capital Steering to bring together legal, risk, and supervisory perspectives
when ruling on national banks’ funding practices. Capital Steering meets regularly
to review proposals for funding products submitted by national banks. In the meeting, capital policy staff explain the funding products—many of which are OBS
items—in order to educate staff from other divisions. By institutionalizing information sharing about the frontiers of national banks’ OBS activities, Capital Steering
keeps the Comptroller’s knowledge base about funding current.
276
Institutional theory about innovation in government bureaucracy, however,
indicates that the suggestion to form a capital structure analysis unit will not be
adopted. See generally OLIVER WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 219–49
(1996) (identifying structural institutional forces that restrict innovative change).
277
For example, in 2000, the SEC received nearly 100,000 separate filings by issuers describing securities products and transactions, a cornucopia of data about financial market structure. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 265 (finding that
securities market structure changes had dramatically increased the volume and complexity of the SEC’s workload and recommending increased capacity for the agency).
The Division of Corporate Finance has the most complete knowledge base about financing trends because the unit reviews prospectuses about new securities. A Webe-
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an example of the kind of aggregate market structure analysis that
should be a routine matter for the agency.
At present, decisions about materiality are left to individual public companies, subject to adjudication to determine whether with the
benefit of hindsight a registrant properly evaluated the materiality of
279
a particular financial fact.
Given the recurring funding situations
faced by firms, though, some financing practices are presumptively
material, as a matter of effective capital structure. However, judges,
lawyers, and investors do not have the benefit of market-wide data
when interpreting materiality. Armed with such market-wide knowledge, the SEC could provide more interpretive advice in the context
of market structure as a whole. Information intermediaries like investment advisors and business newspapers would disseminate this information to a wider investing public. Better capital structure surveillance would also help the SEC to exercise its oversight duties over the
new Public Company Accounting Oversight Board created by the
280
Act.

rian bureaucracy, the Division divides prospectus review by industry such that few
staff know more than one industry well.
278
See SEC Report, supra note 17.
279
A presumption encourages uniformity in an area that few investors and other
market participants understand, lets registrants rebut this presumption in circumstances in which the financing trend does not materially impact a firm’s liquidity or
capital, and preserves judicial discretion to determine when a rebuttal of the presumption is justified. This approach is also consistent with the tacit recognition in
financial reporting law that certain events are deemed to be so material to a firm that
a public issuer must file a Form 8-K as required by 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-11 (2005).
280
The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) is a private nonprofit organization. It oversees public company audits by developing audit standards, inspecting accounting firms, investigating and disciplining auditors, and conducting disciplinary proceedings. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 §§ 101, 107, 15
U.S.C. §§ 7211, 7217 (2000 & Supp. II 2002). The SEC appoints Board members,
approves Board rules and professional standards, approves the Board’s budget, and
acts as an appellate body for disciplinary actions and disputes arising from the
Board’s inspection reports. See generally Richard I. Miller & Paul H. Pashkoff, Regulations Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, J. ACCOUNTANCY, Oct. 2002, at 33, available at
http://www.aicpa.org/PUBS/JOFA/oct2002/miller.htm (summarizing the implications of the Act for the auditing profession). To date, the Board has registered 1522
audit firms. See PCAOB, Registered Public Accounting Firms, http://www.pcaobus.
org/Registration/Registered_Firms.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2006). Eventually the
Board expects to have 200 full-time staff. See Accounting Under Sarbanes-Oxley: Are Financial Statements More Reliable? Before the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 108th Cong. 4
(2003) (testimony of William J. McDonough, Chairman, Public Company Accounting Oversight Board), available at http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS47468. This
was the first hearing that Congress convened after the Act to review its implementation. Congress then held a second hearing to review progress further. Hearings on
Sarbanes-Oxley: Two Years of Market and Investor Recovery Before the H. Comm. on Financial
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V. THERE WILL ALWAYS BE AN ENRON (PROLEGOMENON)
We live in an economy organized around market risk, in which
unrealized gain in financial assets will continue to be the chief store
of wealth. Preserving the dignity of investors requires clearer disclosure about the market risk of unrealized gain, sobering though such
disclosure may be. Not that any of this will prevent future financial
disasters. So long as there are firms trying to economize on funding
efficiencies (for both fiduciary and opportunistic motives), traders
willing to help, and investors looking for a financial return, there will
281
always be an Enron.
Given this structural implication of the rules of the game, it
would behoove the legal profession to produce lawyers who are more
financially fluent. Hindsight tells the repeat players in law school—
law professors and deans—that some students may have a calling for
transactional finance. These students are generally underserved by
282
the current curriculum at many law schools. Forced to take a random walk through the first year of law school, they typically begin
upper-level courses without the basic analytical methods in finance,
accounting, and game theory. Increasingly, these methods inform
the performance expectations for an effective transactional lawyer,
especially one who will be advising a chief financial officer, poised as
the office is to bear liability and calumnies, especially after recent history’s devilish depiction of this corporate official. For these students,
fewer brambles and more financial analytic methods are needed. In
closing, I call on my transactional law colleagues to foster more integration of analytical financial methods into a basic legal education.
Such an approach might produce more transactional lawyers capable
of spotting and stemming future financial moral panics.

Services, 108th Cong. (2004), available at http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/
LPS56380.
281
That conclusion is implied in the idea of the “regulatory dialectic.” See Pouncy,
supra note 2, at 546.
282
One exception is the positive trend in legal education towards increased training for law students in transactional law in the development of analytical methods
courses. See, e.g., HOWELL E. JACKSON ET AL., ANALYTICAL METHODS FOR LAWYERS
(1989) (assembles game theory, accounting, finance, statistics, and other transactional methodologies for use in a first-year or upper-level law school course). An
elective first-year methods class at Harvard Law School uses this book, a fitting penance from the institution that helped to fossilize the Langdellian approach in the
first place.

